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ABSTRACT
This thesis was written to provide the reader with a firm understanding of the realities of
the current DoD space deterrence concept, its shortcomings and the threat that these
shortcomings pose to the United States and its Allies if a more realistic, credible space
deterrence concept is not created and deployed. To highlight these shortcomings, a review
of deterrence theory from classical to modern writers were explored to compare and
contrast with the DoD’s present concept to highlight its lack of deterrence theory. In
addition, it was highlighted through an analysis of the Chinese view of deterrence in space,
space weapons and the United States, just how in effective DoD space deterrence theory is
and how the current National Security Space Strategy, the location of the DoD space
deterrence concept, is more likely to give rise to a “space Pearl Harbor” than to prevent
one. The United States must re-think its current posture in space and develop a tiered, tailor,
triad of capabilities and concepts that credibly deter, or if necessary defeat an enemy attack
on our nation’s critical space infrastructure.
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INTRODUCTION

In the foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter’s book Pearl Harbor: Warning and
Decision, Thomas Schelling stated that “there is a tendency in our planning to confuse
the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not considered looks
strange; what looks strange is thought improbable; what is improbable need not be
considered seriously.”1 In the arena of the strategic space environment, this lesson of the
past seems to have been lost on the creators of the present DoD space deterrence concept
found in the 2011 Secretary of Defense/Director of National Intelligence’s National
Security Space Strategy (NSSS) as many of the threats deemed improbable by
commentators and researchers within this topic have become policy while US space
systems, critical infrastructure in their own right upon which the American system of
economics, defense and diplomacy are dependent, remain vulnerable to a surprise attack
on the order and magnitude of the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack.
This thesis will examine this space deterrence concept and the ideological
foundations as compared with classical deterrence theory, modern deterrence theory, and
potential adversary strategic culture. The potential adversary analyzed will be the
People’s Republic of China as its rapid development and advancement of counterspace
forces have raised the concern of many in the national security space community and
highlights the importance of evaluating and observing strategic culture and behavior of
the adversary to understand the trends found in strategic reality rather than expecting

1

Wholstetter, Roberta. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Stanford University Press. 1962. P. vii
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national leaders to accept American concepts without the context of where they are
situated in geography and thought. Deterrence without understanding the decision cycle
of the adversary will not be effective.
Chapter 1 will begin by analyzing the four elements of the NSSS space deterrence
through the prism of history with the deterrence theories of Herman Kahn, Thomas
Schelling, and Keith Payne. These three were chosen as representatives of the various
deterrence theories throughout Cold War and post-Cold War history. This review of the
development of deterrence theory in the Western world will demonstrate that while the
word “deterrence” is utilized in the NSSS, the DoD space deterrence concept is not, in
fact, deterrence at all.
Chapter 2 highlights the unique strategic culture and worldview of the Chinese
people and their government as devised and led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
and its influence upon their views of space doctrine, warfighting capabilities and
deterrence definitions. This chapter will provide analysis that demonstrates why the
NSSS is not deterring this potential near peer adversary due to the drafters’ apparent lack
of understanding of the Chinese unique strategic culture and ignoring of their objectives
and behavior in favor of an ineffective plan.
Chapter 3 provides further details of what is at stake in this discussion on space
deterrence and the importance of the United States to prepare for the potential for
destructive warfighting within the space domain. It utilizes a combination of Chinese
strategic thinking with the theories of John Boyd and Herman Kahn2 to develop a way to
During the analysis found in Chapter 1 and 2 on the state of deterrence views from both a Western and
Chinese perspective, Herman Kahn’s approach to having a robust set of capabilities (offensive and
defensive) appears to have more application to a war that extends or begins in space over the Pacific with
2

2

achieve an escalation dominance within a tiered, tailored approach to deterrence in space
consisting of a near term achievable triad of capabilities. These capabilities provide near
term, achievable active defenses and deterrent capacity to reverse the first strike
instability inherent in the strategic environment due to the NSSS’ ineffective deterrent
strategy.
This thesis’ objective is to provide an appraisal of what is considered improbable
to highlight that history and experience have shown that those actions that some in the
government and academia view as improbable are the result of mirror imaging.
Furthermore, such improbabilities could very well lead the US into a situation where
American and allied way of life is severely damaged by a surprise attack that will be as
one author put it, “not due to a lack of warning, but the result of a tendency to dismiss as
reckless what we consider improbable.”3 The United States must prepare for what is
improbable to some, to protect the homeland and its vital interests.

the Chinese. In addition, as Chapter 2 and 3 will highlight, Col John Boyd’s analysis and proposals for
rapid decision making and deterrence synchronize well with the merger of Chinese thought and American
spacepower force application at the strategic and operational levels.
3
Rumsfeld, Donald et al. Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space
Management and Organization.2001.p. 15
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CHAPTER 1: SECURITY THROUGH VULNERABILITY: THE NATIONAL
SECURITY SPACE STRATEGY’S VIEW OF SPACE DETERRENCE
“Culture is at the root and foundation of strategy”People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Li Jijun
“A nation’s security cannot be based solely on estimations of its [adversary’s] military
capacity” Dr. Barry Schneider, Tailored Deterrence
The concept of deterrence has been an integral part of American national security
strategy for decades. Following a debris-generating Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test in
2007, some in the space policy community began to question whether or not the space
domain was destined to become a theater of warfare and if its days as a sanctuary4 free
from weaponization were over.5 Since then the world has witnessed several more nondestructive ASAT tests by the Chinese, lasing of satellites, and an apparent new norm of
nation-state behavior6 in space via the tripling of reversible counterspace attacks such as
jamming and other means of interference.7 This increased counterspace activity creates
fear in the minds of some space arms control advocates that any conflict that includes
space will result in leaving low Earth orbit unusable and “endangering all those who
operate” in space.8

The Arms Control Association has referred to weapons in space as a “radical and reckless option” and that
any country that flight-tests, deploys or uses space weapons is a threat to the activities of all other space
faring nations.
5
Some authors such as Lt Col Bruce DeBlois have argued over the last several years that space sanctuary
has been the best national policy to protect our advantages. However, space has not been a sanctuary given
his own admission of Soviet co-orbital ASATs being tested and deployed from the late 1960s until the end
of the Cold War. Sanctuary must mean all weapons, not just US weapons. Sadly, it appears his definition
only applies to US weapons. See “Space Sanctuary: A Viable National Strategy, Air and Space Power
Journal Winter 1998
6
A norm of behavior is defined by Michael Krepon as standards of proper or acceptable behavior - See
more at: http://spacenews.com/41789norm-setting-for-outer-space/#sthash.hH9NIG5D.dpuf
7
De Selding, Peter B. “Eutelsat Blames Ethiopia as Jamming Incidents Triple”. Space News. June 6, 2014
8
Weeden, Brian et al. An Introduction to Ostrom’s Eighth Principles for Sustainable Governance of
Common-Pool Resources as a Possible Framework for Sustainable Governance of Space. 2010
4
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Due to these and other concerns, numerous organizations began in 2009 to
research the possibility of utilizing a strategy of deterrence as an answer to the threat of
the proliferation of space weapons and the likelihood of their use in anger. This chapter
will examine the National Security Space Strategy’s (NSSS) concept of space deterrence
through a historical lens comparing and contrasting its four elements of space deterrence
with the nuclear deterrence theories of Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, and post-Cold
War theorists such as Keith Payne.
An Overview of the NSSS’s Four Elements Deterrent Effects
There have been several space deterrence concepts proposed since 2008, but only
one has become formal DoD strategy: the “delicate balance of risk”9 or four elements
concept.10 Originally devised by the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies at
the US Air Force Academy in 2010, it was adopted by the Office of Secretary of
Defense’s Space Policy office then under the leadership of Ambassador Gregory Schulte
in 201111. The vision of this concept as codified in the NSSS is to “dissuade and deter the
development, testing, and employment of counterspace systems and prevent and deter
aggression against space systems and supporting infrastructure that support US national
security.”12

Harrison, et al. “The Delicate Balance of Risk”: Space Deterrence Study. Eisenhower Center for Space
and Defense Studies. USAFA. 2010
10
Those space deterrence theories include: Forrest Morgan’s “First Strike Stability in Space”, Brian
Weeden’s “Denial Deterrence” and the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense’s “A Stable Balance of
Risk”-four elements
11
Ambassador Gregory Schulte was a career diplomat with an emphasis on arms control negotiation prior
to his assignment as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy.
12
National Security Space Strategy. 2011
9
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The NSSS’s multi-layered concept consists of 1) Deterrence Through Norms;2)
Deterrence Through Entanglement/Alliances; 3) Deterrence Through Resilience; and 4)
Deterrence Through Response.13 Below is a short synopsis of each of these elements.
In the first element, the DoD states that a “top down diplomatic initiative”14 that
promotes the “responsible use of space”15 and condemns the “activities that threaten the
safety, stability and security of the space domain”16 will “preserve our advantage”17 in
space as well as deter potential aggressors from interfering or attacking United States and
allied space systems. According to Ambassador Schulte, the deterrent effect of this
element of space deterrence is through the process of defining what is and is not
responsible behavior.18 Examples of this process include the European Union-proposed
International Code of Conduct as well as the advancement of transparency and
confidence building measures (TCBMs).19 Enforcement of these norms could occur
through the diplomatic and economic isolation of irresponsible actors should any states
deviate from the agreed, yet legally non-binding framework. International pressures
based on non-legally binding agreements are the tools of deterrence through norms
according to the present DoD strategy.20

Harrison et al. “The Delicate Balance of Risk”: Space Deterrence Study. Eisenhower Center for Space
and Defense Studies. USAFA. 2010
14
Schulte, Gregory. “Protecting Global Security in Space”. Presentation at the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, May 9, 2012
15
National Security Space Strategy. Department of Defense. 2011. P. 2
16
Ibid. P. 2
17
Schulte et. al. “Enhancing Security Through Responsible Use of Space.” Strategic Studies Quarterly.
2011.
18
Schulte, Gregory. “Protecting Global Security in Space”. Presentation at the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, May 9, 2012 p. 5
19
Ibid. p. 11
20
Author’s note: Using all instruments of national power is the preferred method, what is different is the
reliance on only a few and a heavy emphasis on an uncoordinated and hollow perceived diplomatic
framework.
13
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The second element discussed in the NSSS is “Deterrence Through
Entanglement,” specifically, the development of “alliances with other space faring
nations…and international organizations.”21 The idea is if an adversary nation, not
deterred by the agreed, non-legally binding norms of responsible behavior, decides to act
in a destabilizing manner by attacking or interfering with a US or allied spacecraft, the
fact that those spacecraft have the backing and reliance of multiple nation states would
make it less likely that the adversary would strike.22 These alliances, it should be noted,
are about the sharing of satellite services. No evidence is provided to indicate that any
active space defenses or retaliatory terrestrial options are included in such alliance
relationships from either the United States or with US allies and space partners. The
cooperative agreements between the United States and Australia with the Wideband
Global SATCOM satellites (WGS) is one example of this type of relationship.23
As a result of the lack of counterspace capabilities through the alliances, the
responses could be economic or diplomatic in nature, or perhaps least likely, lead to some
unstated terrestrial military response. However, despite this lack of stated enforcement or
protection capacity of the alliances proposed, it is stated in speeches and articles that this
construct will “alter the enemy’s targeting calculus” and create in the mind of an
adversary nation some restraint of attacking several nations rather than just one.24

National Security Space Strategy. Department of Defense. 2011. P.3
Schulte, Gregory. “Protecting Global Security in Space”. Presentation at the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies Nanyang Technological University, Singapore May 9, 2012. P.5
23
Ibid. p. 5
24
One paper refers to this concept as a “100 Satellite Deterrent” speaking of sharing constellations of vital
capabilities but with no mention of how to defend these satellites upon which more nations are now reliant.
21
22
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The third element is described as “deterrence through resilience.” This measure
would assure “cost-effective protection” of US space systems supporting both
conventional and nuclear command and control through measures such as the
improvement of our “intelligence posture” via space situational awareness capabilities
and “disaggregation.” 25 These capabilities enable the United States to “better monitor
and attribute activities in the space domain [and] maintain awareness of …the
capabilities, activities and intentions of others.”26 The resilience concept of
disaggregation requires that, rather than building large, single mission architectures of a
few satellites, changing the architecture to include smaller, dispersed satellites or hosting
payloads on civil or commercial spacecraft would create a means to maintain some
operational capability following an attack, thereby denying benefit of the attack to the
adversary27. As Air Force Space Command’s 2013 White Paper on the topic states:
“Disaggregation is an innovative opportunity to stay ahead of our adversaries, to change
their targeting calculus, and to mitigate the effects of a widespread attack on our space
assets. In addition, resilience serves as a deterrent, which may be the best way to
preserve our capability by avoiding an attack.”28
Finally, there is the fourth deterrent element, which is labeled “deterrence through
response.” As the NSSS states, this deterrent is to follow after an attack has taken place
and shows that the United States “retains the right and capabilities to respond in self-

“Resiliency and Disaggregated Space Architectures.” Air Force Space Command White Paper. 2013. P.
12
26
National Security Space Strategy. Department of Defense. P. 17
27
Disaggregation is defined by Air Force Space Command as: the dispersion of space-based missions,
functions or sensors across multiple systems spanning one or more orbital plane, platform, host or domain.
28
“Resiliency and Disaggregated Space Architectures.” Air Force Space Command White Paper. 2013. P.
10
25

8

defense, should deterrence fail.”29 These responses, however will “not necessarily come
from space,” creating some uncertainty as to what, if anything, the United States would
do in the event of space deterrence failure. As noted earlier, the NSSS does not
specifically go into any details about what type of capabilities, active defenses, or
offensive retaliatory strike options either terrestrially or in space are required to assure
either the US or the allies of the credibility of the deterrent effect of the this response
option in the NSSS. In addition, there appears to be some disconnect between this DoD
strategy and the National Space Policy of the United States of America released by the
White House in 2010. In the latter document, it states that the United States will “deter
others from interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the
defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack them.”30
The Space Deterrence of the National Security Space Strategy: Its Ideological
Foundations
Defending space systems is critical due to the strategic and force multiplier effects
derived from them.31 However, as one commentator wrote, “Recently posited theories of
space deterrence misuse the term deterrence, they do not grasp the intent of deterrence,
the full range of other security constructs, and, most importantly, what should be done
when, not if, deterrence fails.”32 Looking at the NSSS’ concept of space deterrence
through the historical lens of classical deterrence theory highlights his point. This then

National Security Space Strategy. Department of Defense. P.17
White House, National Space Policy of the United States of America. June 2010. P. 3
31
Marquez, Peter. “Space Deterrence: The Pret a Porter Suit for the Naked Emperor.” Marshall Institute.
2011. P.9
32
Ibid. p 9
29
30
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begs the question, if this concept does not grasp the intent of deterrence, why was the
four element concept adopted?
Deterrence, according to DoD doctrine is defined as: “The prevention of action by
the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost
of action outweighs the perceived benefits.”33 Merriam-Webster defines deterrence, in the
context of politics, as “the policy of developing a lot of military power so that other
countries will not attack your country.”34 The action that the United States aimed to
prevent throughout the Cold War through “a lot of military power” was a surprise nuclear
attack by the Soviet Union, or a nuclear Pearl Harbor as the Surprise Attack Panel35
referred to it.36
As stated above, the common threat being deterred is hostile acts in space and
their resulting impacts on the “sustainability of outer space.”37 However, as with the
idealist arms control position of the Cold War nuclear policy debate, the mere presence of
nuclear weapons was considered the common threat. Likewise, the idealists promoting
arms control as a space deterrence concept consider the presence of weapons in space in a
similar manner and the threats posed by near peer adversaries, such as China’s multi-

JP 1-02 Dictionary of Military Terms
Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online. www.merriam-webster.com
35
Terrill, Delbert R. The Air Force Role in Developing International Outer Space Law. AU Press. p. 8
36
The Surprise Attack Panel was a group of government and industry leaders who were tasked with
assessing the vulnerability of the United States to a surprise nuclear strike by the Soviet Union in the early
days of the Cold War. The goal was to prevent a nuclear Pearl Harbor, through the development of an
adequate national defense infrastructure coupled with robust intelligence to prevent surprise.
37
The 2013 Space Security Index states, “The application of some destructive negation capabilities, such as
kinetic-intercept vehicles, would also generate space debris that could potentially inflict widespread
damage on other space systems and undermine the sustainability of outer space.” The report is managed
and published by Project Ploughshares with support and funding from Secure World Foundation, The
Simons Foundation, the International Security Research and Outreach Programme at Foreign Affairs and
International Trade Canada, and the Erin J.C. Arsenault Trust at McGill University. See
http://ploughshares.ca/ t
33
34
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layered capabilities, less of an issue than space debris.38 This is supported by the
overarching vision of the NSSS.
As an example, within Schelling’s stable balance of terror concept of nuclear
deterrence, each side maintains a survivable, similar, deterrent force capable of quick
retaliation if attacked. The space deterrence strategy in the NSSS does not advocate for a
second strike option, much less a first-strike option, in the event of deterrence failure.
The strategy rejects the testing, deployment, and use of space weapons as being
destabilizing to the sustainability of outer space and its use for peaceful purposes. The
deterrence of the “delicate balance of risk” is predicated on the belief that, like the
idealist view of international relations, security and deterrence in space can be achieved
through the international system and institutions, such as treaties and codes of conduct.
Thus, deterrent effect is not based on any overt threat of retaliation or the prevention of
damage to space systems from attack through active defenses, but through the implied
threat of isolation through the international community of nations. As defined earlier, this
is not the traditional definition of deterrence.
Analysis - Schelling, Kahn, and Post-Cold War Theories Meet the DoD Space
Deterrence Strategy
The idea of space warfare, especially of kinetic engagements in orbital space is
viewed by many as “unthinkable” given the aforementioned fear of a debris-laden
“tragedy of the commons.”39 As with the Cold War decision to prevent nuclear war

Michael Krepon has been quoted in editorials in Space News as saying that the Earth is surrounded by
thousands of space weapons in the form of orbital debris. .
39
Weeden, Brian et al. “An Introduction to Ostrom’s Eight Principles for Sustainable Governance of
Common-Pool Resources as a Possible Framework for Sustainable Governance in Space. IAC-13-E3.4.2.
p. 3
38
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through deterrence rather than fight an “unthinkable” general war, so space deterrence
seeks to avert the destabilizing actions of war extending into the space domain.
However, as part of the nuclear Cold War strategy, American policymakers
believed that for effective deterrence of aggression from the Soviet Union, there needed
to be a strong, survivable deterrent force ready and willing to retaliate. Schelling
promoted an easy to understand and “cost effective” stable balance of terror model that
agreed with this need for a strong, survivable deterrent. In addition, in order to prevent a
“reciprocal fear of surprise attack,” or in other words a fear that we would attack first, the
creation of active defenses or counterforce capabilities would be prohibited. Schelling’s
theory was also reliant on the vulnerability of American cities to Soviet nuclear weapons.
Some defenses were admissible in this concept. Schelling supported the defense of the
deterrent force itself through passive means such as hardening and dispersal of forces that
would thereby confuse “an enemy’s targeting calculus.”
From an arms control position, Schelling advocated for a stable balance of
capability, rather than disarmament as the goal. Both societies being mutually vulnerable
to attack was key to prevent the need for what was claimed to be destabilizing options
such as ballistic missile defenses and first-strike weapons.
Herman Kahn’s view of nuclear deterrence disagreed with Schelling’s advocacy
of a stable balance; rather, he believed that giving the President multiple capabilities and
weapons platforms to retaliate with if deterrence failed, was essential.40 However, simply
stating that you had a strong deterrent capability and you intended to use that force means

40

Payne, Keith. The Great American Gamble. National Institute for Public Policy Press. 2008. P. 51

12

nothing if it is not credible. To ensure credibility of the will to use that deterrent force,
defenses to protect the American people were essential so that the Soviets understood that
the Americans would keep their extended deterrence and homeland deterrence roles by
not having to commit national suicide in the process of defending allies overseas. This
would assure the Soviets that Americans would keep their commitments and would not
be blackmailed by threats or acts of aggression.41
Strategic messaging was an important part of both Schelling and Kahn’s
deterrence theories. Schelling’s stable balance of terror was designed to assure the
Soviets of our second strike capability, while Kahn’s credible deterrence concept was
designed to assure allies relying on extended deterrence and the American people.42
When reviewing the aforementioned DoD space deterrent proposals, one can see
that they use the term deterrence in a very different manner than those of Schelling and
Kahn. As one commentator stated, “…they do not grasp the intent of deterrence, the full
range of other security constructs and, most importantly, what should be done when, not
if, deterrence fails.”43 In the arena of strategic messaging, the present DoD space
deterrence strategy is, like Schelling’s, meant more to assure potential adversaries of
what we will not do, rather than what we will do. As an example, the NSSS states that by
not developing ASAT weapons for active defense or offensive retaliatory forces, and
continuing to promote responsible behavior through non-binding norms and TCBMs, we
are ensuring protection and security of our space systems. In some ways, like Schelling,

Ibid. P. 52
Ibid. p. 52
43
Marquez, Peter. “Space Deterrence: The Pret a Porter Suit for the Naked Emperor”. Marshall Institute,
2011
41
42
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this idea appears to desire a sort of certainty of uncertainty44 that while the United States
has not articulated how or with what force it would defend itself, the United States
reserves the right to act in self-defense. This type of uncertainty, however, is counter to
both the Schelling and Kahn models as it lacks the explicit commitment to retaliate. The
space deterrence concept in the NSSS is similar to Schelling’s views in that it adheres to
the belief that defenses of any kind, excluding measures to ensure survivability, are
prohibited given the goal of the NSSS is to prevent the placement and use of weapons
disrupting the sanctuary of orbital space.
Regarding the concept of deterrence through resilience, as during the Cold War
when nuclear forces were dispersed globally and hardened to ensure survivability and the
“confusing of the enemy’s targeting calculus,” so this concept of resilience aims to
achieve a deterrent effect by a similar confusion of targeting in space. While
disaggregation and other resilience measures promoted in the NSSS do offer some
interesting concepts related to survivability, the NSSS does not provide any more
deterrent effect or defense to space attack45 than the dispersal of ICBMs did in preventing
the development of nuclear counterforce weapons by the Soviet Union during the Cold
War. These measures in the Cold War led to more weapons being built to threaten the US
nuclear forces and society, not less creation or less testing of nuclear weapons. In the 21st
Century strategic space environment, having more targets in space may challenge a
potential adversary’s targeting calculus, but given different national interests and

“Certainty of uncertainty” is a phrase Thomas Schelling in Arms and Influence use to describe that being
certain that uncertainty exists regarding potential adversary retaliation enables deterrence to be effective.
45
The DoD Nuclear Matters Handbook states that dispersing nuclear forces as part of survivability
enhancement enhances both “deterrent value and the potential military utility” of nuclear forces but not
deterrent effect.
44
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strategic cultures, it may not deter its weapons testing. It will more likely lead to more
weapons or capabilities to defeat the disaggregated architectures and passive measures
employed.
Despite the respect the concepts of Kahn and Schelling of Cold War deterrence
theories have and the lessons that can be applied to space deterrence frameworks, the
Post-Cold War deterrence theories (also known as Third Wave), such as those developed
by Keith Payne, adds additional context to the discussion.46 Unlike others, Payne believes
that the Cold War frameworks were not as effective in the Cold War due to many factors.
One of these factors was that both Schelling and Kahn relied on the idea that national
leadership on both sides consisted of rational actors with similar concepts of cost and
benefit. As Payne noted, “historical studies consistently demonstrate that the deterrence
theory assumption of well-informed leaders operating reasonably, rationally, and thus
predictably, frequently does not correspond with actual crisis decision making; and
deterrence, therefore, can fail or not apply.”47 Thus, as with Cold War deterrence theory,
the space deterrence theory of the NSSS is based on the assumption that national leaders
are rational actors who will agree with the proposed norms of behavior and their
definition of what is considered “responsible.” Why is this not a realistic expectation?
This is because of numerous factors such as “an individual’s personal beliefs and
characteristics, a leadership’s political goals, ideology, perception of threat, [and]

The term “third wave” is used to describe post-Cold War deterrence theorists such as Keith Payne and
Therese Delpech. These writers do not simply add to the thoughts of the past, in many cases they refute and
replace the classical theory with new perspectives related to strategic culture and decisional intent rather
than mirror imaged view of national leaders. Keith Payne has published such works as The Great American
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Deterrence in the 21st Century. All are cited in this thesis.
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determination"48 among other traits. A look at history highlights a recurring theme that
“beliefs and modes of thought have been the dynamic behind some of the most
significant and surprising decision making”49 in the last century.
It appears that during the 2009-10 Space Posture Review’s50 development of these
deterrent elements for space, there was a lack of robust historical analysis undertaken
with respect to each element and whether or not, in other domains such as air, land or sea,
these concepts have been effective in preventing war or use of certain types of
weaponry51. Regarding the deterrence through norms element of the policy, there have
been numerous occasions where treaties, conventions, and covenants between nations
were breached. In fact, a look at the historical track record shows that the real norm of
international relations is that of treaty or convention breach.52 While it is a laudable goal
to push for norms of non-interference in space, the reality of the space environment
heralded in the open press highlights is that of reversible interference53 at least, and the
desire of kinetic ASATs and testing by many space faring nations at worst.54
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One example of how the space deterrence framework has not taken into account
the dynamics of political differences of leadership is related to the resilience/deterrence
by denial concept. The NSSS stated that the space deterrence strategy following this
model “doesn’t need to be specifically created for a certain adversary in a certain
situation… [and that one doesn’t] need to know who the adversary is.”55 The document
asserts that it works as a blanket strategy within the international system. This Schellingtype view suggests that many of the underlying assumptions of the DoD space deterrence
strategy may be based on mirror imaging.56 As Payne notes, “[S]pinning out untutored
certitudes about how a foreign leadership sees the world and should behave is relatively
easy and extreme confidence in deterrence in comforting…”57 This is what the NSSS
appears to be providing to the DoD as its strategy rather than confronting the issues in a
realistic and achievable way.
Mirror imaging is a cognitive trap where planners or policymakers believe that
their adversaries think like they do and share the same fears, beliefs, and worldview.
Examples of mirror imaging within the four elements include the assumption that nations
that do not accept the “norms of responsible behavior” would agree they are acting
“irresponsibly” as defined by the US Department of Defense, especially if it contradicts
what they perceive as their vital national interests.
Despite the foundational principles of DoD space deterrence being within the
space sanctuary and idealist school of international relations theory, the fact that the DoD
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NSSS advocates for new norms of responsible behavior and codes of conduct may
indicate a realization that this foundation of space as a sanctuary is not reflective of
reality and indicates an attempt to be perceived in the international arena as promoting
the world they seek rather than the world that is.58 In addition, the utilization of
terminology such as “fight through” and “operate in degraded environments” highlights
the failure of the objective of the NSSS’s deterrence structures.59
Finally, the fourth element of this concept is “deterrence through response.”
Rather than providing a clear articulation of what, as one observer called “the willingness
to use power to punish hostile actions,” this strategy provides very broad and nebulous
statements indicating a lack of will and capability to respond forcefully.60 As stated
recently, “China… [has] already developed counterspace capabilities and have shown the
political willingness to use these weapons…”61 However, the United States and its allies
are not developing sets of military options to accompany the diplomatic options tailored
for the types of adversaries we are likely to engage, or are already taking hits from on the
reversible side. The vulnerability of our spacecraft, which are more and more becoming
critical infrastructure for our economy and military force projection, is not a security
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policy or one of effective deterrence. In fact, it could be perceived as an invitation to
strike.
Chapter Conclusions
The NSSS’ space deterrence strategy provides a construct that while well
intentioned, lacks a firm understanding of the lessons from Cold War deterrence and the
contextual understanding of the security environments in terms of historical and cultural
realties raised by the post-Cold War nuclear deterrence advocates. The four elements
approach to deterrence appears to be an incomplete strategy focused heavily on a
perceived diplomatic framework for the promotion of an arms control agenda in support
of the sanctuary spacepower theory, not the deterrence of aggression and the active
protection of United States access to and freedom of action in space. It lacks the robust
strategic cultural, historical, and psychological substance necessary to create a framework
needed to deter or dissuade the use of space weapons of either a reversible or more
permanent nature.
The fact that states have increasingly been conducting reversible space attacks
against other states and private sector space owners and operators over the years has
shown that the real norm of behavior in space between states is of interference, not noninterference. The active ASAT testing highlights that NSSS is not deterring the testing
and development of space weapons systems as the NSSS asserts it does. While engaging
in the promotion of resilience, the ability to absorb attacks and have redundancies are
good first steps, other nations are engaging in more aggressive efforts to develop and
deploy active space offensive and defensive capabilities. We are only deterring ourselves
with our own sophistry which fails to pass the reality check.
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To paraphrase Therese Delpech, self-deterrence encourages the proliferation of
space weapons, and it may become an invitation to actually use them.62 We must re-look
at the space deterrence concept the DoD is using to create our future architectures and
strategies for space security, so we are better able to tailor our deterrence strategy to the
adversaries we might face and are facing in the strategic environment of space.
The United States, through the DoD/DNI’s space deterrence concept in the
National Security Space Strategy, is not effectively deterring potential near peer
adversaries such as the People’s Republic of China. This is partially due to a lack of
understanding of the importance of strategic culture in assessing the intent of adversary
leadership during peacetime escalation to crisis to effective deter further escalation to
war. As a result, the present space deterrence concept lacks familiarity with classical
deterrence thought as well as the critical differences between Western and Eastern
concepts of deterrence. This will be covered in detail in Chapter 2.
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CHAPTER 2: THE IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STRATEGIC CULTURE ON
CHINESE COUNTER-INTERVENTION AND SPACE DETERRENCE
OPERATIONS
“Anti-satellite weapons can be developed at low cost and that can strike at the enemy’s
enormously expensive yet vulnerable space systems will become an important option…to
deter...powerful enemies….”-PLA Analysts Li Hechun and Chen Youong “Sky War – A
New form of War That Might Erupt in the Future,” Liberation Army Daily (online), 17
January 2001
“Strategic thought is always formed on the basis of certain historical and national
cultural traditions, and formulation and performance of strategy by strategists are
always controlled and driven by certain cultural ideology and historical cultural
complex”-PLA’s The Science of Military Strategy 2005
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its rapidly evolving space forces are
viewed to be one of the principal threats to the United States’ national security space
infrastructure and the US capability for timely force projection in the Pacific Theater63.
This view, especially given the 2007 kinetic ASAT weapons test, added emphasis to the
Space Posture Review of 2010 and the Department of Defense’s quest for deterrence as a
means to secure the sanctuary of space from weaponization. This chapter will examine
the strategic culture of the PRC and how it impacts the space deterrence philosophies of
both the PRC and the United States Department of Defense.
A Brief History of Mirror Imaging in DoD Deterrence Policy
The United States has typically been very effective at assessing adversary
capabilities using overhead reconnaissance technology and other capabilities to develop
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assessments on adversary orders of battle and force laydown. However, a much more
difficult task is assessing an adversary’s intent64. This important facet of getting the “big
picture” is essentially finding an answer to that “why” question behind an adversary’s
decision calculus and resulting strategic actions.65 Understanding the rationale behind a
nation’s cost/benefit worldview is important for effective deterrence. As Sun Tzu wrote,
it is better to win the battle in the mind of the enemy commander before the battle begins
than during an actual engagement.66
The assumption of a deterrence environment between two rational, stable
governments with similar views on cost/benefit analysis has been proven throughout
history to be much less realistic. 67 In addition, relying on assumptions of adversaries
being deterred by a gentleman’s agreement, treaty, or code of conduct alone fails to
recognize the historical record of such an approach to national security and deterrence.68
During the Cold War, it was widely viewed as the foundation of deterrence that an
adversary would be rational and reasonable and therefore predictable and controllable.69
As a result of this worldview, American theorists viewed both sides within a nuclear
deterrence construct as having devastating capability to retaliate under a “mutual
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restraint” structure as the best approach for enhancing “stability” and “security.” 70 This
“mutual vulnerability” model would keep the world safe as any rational leader would be
deterred from aggression by the threat of prompt second strike by the other side.
Payne argues that this methodology was “taken to the extreme in the United
States” through the minimal attention given to the “specific thoughts, goals and values of
the Soviet leadership” and that many scholars and policymakers “assumed that they knew
how any ’sane‘ Soviet leader would view nuclear weapons, and how deterrence would
therefore operate.”71 In reality, nobody really knew the prospective damage that was
needed to effectively deter the Soviet leadership and therefore “[United States] values
and norms [were] ascribed to the Soviet leadership” driving U.S. conclusions and
planning on how to deter the Soviet Union.72 This “mirror imaging,” while easy to grasp
and more comforting than a full analysis of adversary values, norms, and decision
making processes, led to the perpetuation of the fallacy that this concept of “mutual
deterrence” was in fact “stable” and effective in protecting the US and allied populations
and strategic interests. Evidence shown after the end of the Cold War highlights the
“lethal mismatch between Western deterrence theory and Soviet war planning,” that may
have led to serious repercussions had any crisis escalated.73
This same type of mirror imaging has, unfortunately, served as the model of
development for the DoD’s space deterrence framework codified in the NSSS.
Congressional hearings, speeches, and strategy journal articles by then-Deputy Assistant
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Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, Ambassador Gregory Schulte, and others in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense highlight this “mutual vulnerability” view as the
baseline for the DoD’s present space deterrence framework. In his presentation to the
US-China Economic and Security Commission in 2011, Ambassador Schulte stated that
while China was developing a vast array of counterspace capabilities and tested kinetic
intercept anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, the Chinese government “shares our interest in
the safety, stability, and security of the [space] domain”74 and “have common interests in
promoting the peaceful use of outer space.”75 In addition, Schulte stressed the importance
of the “common understanding of the operating domain” between the US and China and
how “increasing the transparency of space operations” reduces the risk of miscalculation
in a future crisis. 76
Does the People’s Republic of China truly share the same security interests in
space with the United States? Does the Chinese government have common interests in
space with respect to reducing the risks of miscalculation through increased transparency
of space operations? Can the DoD leadership rely on its view of space deterrence to deter
or dissuade the Chinese from the “development, testing, and employment of counterspace
systems,” much less preventing and deterring “aggression against space systems and
supporting infrastructure”?77 The answer to the latter question can be found through an
assessment of the Chinese leadership’s thoughts, goals and values by examining Chinese
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strategic culture and its influence on [Chinese] [the People’s Liberation Army’s] space
deterrence and warfighting doctrines for the space domain.78
The Chinese Strategic Culture and Its Tao of Space Deterrence
Historians and scholars consider China to be one of the oldest civilizations in the
world, lasting for over 5000 years. Many observers of China’s interaction with other
nations throughout history refer to it as “a civilization pretending to be a nation-state.”79
In Chinese mythology, this civilization is said to have no beginning. As one example,
when the Yellow Emperor, considered the founding hero of China, came to power, it was
seen as a restoration of the Chinese empire, not the beginning.80 For most of the
subsequent several thousand years, “the central goal of China’s [imperial] security
strategy had been defending the economic, political, social, and cultural heartland of
China from invasion from…populations and kingdoms residing along China’s
periphery”-in short, maintaining its territorial integrity.81 According to Chinese scholars,
“the ancient Chinese Dynasties that ruled for millennia over China placed great emphasis
on eliminating these “barbarian” threats-not through …military action [alone], but rather
through peaceful diplomatic means.”82 In the 1998 Chinese Defense White Paper, the
Everett Dolman in his book Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age, provides a realist
summary of the push for international norms: “The rhetoric of harmony and cooperation that attends most
popular accounts of humanity’s entry into outer space simply belies the historical record. Despite an
ongoing effort to make the cosmos an international commons (the so-called “province of mankind”,
expansion into near-Earth space came not as the accommodating effort of many nations joined as one, but
rather as an integral component of an overall strategy applied by wary superstates attempting to ensure their
political survival…They established an international regime that ensured none of them could obtained an
unanticipated advantage in space domination-for if any one nation did, the face of international politics
might be changed forever.” This has been the goal of arms control conventions since Russia hosted the first
Hague Convention in the late 19th century.
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Chinese government references this traditional belief of cultural superiority-based selfdefense when it states, “The defensive nature of China’s national defense policy…springs
from the country’s historical and cultural traditions... China is a country with 5000 years
of civilization, and a peace-loving tradition. Ancient Chinese thinkers advocated
‘associating with benevolent gentlemen and befriending good neighbors’ which shows
that throughout history the Chinese people have longed for peace in the world and for
relations of friendship with the people of other countries.”83
The Chinese view of the world has been shaped by history and the blending of
three different philosophies: Taoism, Confucianism, and much later Buddhism. Each of
these emphasized harmony and discouraged abstract speculation or friction.84 In these
philosophies, the world is constantly changing and is full of contradictions. To
understand and appreciate one state of affairs requires the existence of its opposite; what
seems to be true now may be the opposite of what it really is. In contrast to Western
perspectives of linear paths of cause and effect within international relations,
Confucianism (meaning the tradition of the scholars) was “the mainstream intellectual
and ethical tradition in China.”85 Chinese Confucian based thinking tends to view the
world as an “organic whole, difficult to separate into parts, just as the various schools of
thought are often interrelated, in spite of…disagreements and conflicts.”86 Confucian
writings view the Chinese hierarchical place in the international order as starting with the
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existence of a supreme and just Heaven, which oversees the world otherwise known as
“all under Heaven: (tianxia). Heaven gives the mandate to rule the world to a worthy man
and removes it from all tyrants, thereby allowing the use of armed rebellion and/or
revolutions. This Mandate of Heaven [legitimizes all] authority including the authority of
the [Chinese government’s] right to pursue war.”87 Under the authority given by this
Mandate, China is bestowed “the Middle Kingdom,” or the “central country, status with
total supremacy over the known world. 88 As a result of this Sinocentric worldview,
China subsequently viewed the rest of the [nations] as living in “descending states of
barbarism” the farther away they are from China’s political and cultural frontiers.”89 This
view of the world remained with the Chinese dynasties and governments until the
beginning of the “century of humiliation” in the late nineteenth century.
In addition, Confucianism stresses economic well-being and education. The
individual within the Chinese strategic culture works not for self-benefits but for the
collective society. Therefore, the Western concept of liberty and individualism that
Americans hold dear is alien to this culture.
To institutionalize the Chinese concept of world governance and cultural
supremacy of the Chinese, a tributary system was created. This system was based on a
hierarchical structure patterned on the Confucian notion of the “state” which was
modeled after the concept of the family unit. 90 This hierarchical world order “utilized
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unequal relationships between China and its barbarian vassals, but this inequality was
likened to that between father and sons in the Confucian family, unequal but benign.”91
Rather than use military force to “eliminate and control barbarian threats and
deter invasion, the Confucian tributary system “emphasized the sufficiency of the
emperor’s “virtue” to win the peaceful submission of men from afar without the
employment of force or threats.”92 As Confucius wrote, “If remote people are rebellious
[from the Sinocentric world order], our civil culture is to be cultivated to attract them to
our virtues; and when they have been attracted, they must be made contented and
tranquil…He who exercises the government by means of virtues may be compared to the
north polar star, which keeps its place and all the stars turn towards it.”93 This is an
example of “cultural moralism” whereby it is “better to win hearts and minds than to
attack towns and cities.”94 Q. Edward Wang stated that “for some Confucian scholars, to
cultivate moral principles and promote culture among non-Hans [non-Chinese] was more
important than to subdue them with military victory… [and achieve] territorial gains.”95
While Chinese leaders preferred this use of virtue to subdue the tributaries and
other threats to its territorial integrity, the Confucian philosophy also “permitted the
limited use of military means to restore Sinocentric order. Sun-Tzu understood this
reality when he stated that there are times when even the most virtuous leader must resort
to arms in order to maintain social and political order.”96 One author quoted Yongjin
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Zhang on this Chinese responsibility “as the superior moral power…for maintaining and
harmonizing this [Sinocentric] order with the moral examples it set, with institutional
innovations and with force in maintaining Chinese dominance and control” within the
“Mandate.”97
Decisions to use force to restore the Mandate of Heaven and China’s “centralized
authority” are often “linked with the concept of ‘just’ or “righteous wars.”98 Andrew
Scobell mentioned this when he connected the use of force to a Chinese “just war”
doctrine: “The distinction is simple: just wars are good wars, and unjust wars are bad
ones. Just wars are those fought by oppressed groups against oppressors, unjust wars are
ones waged by oppressors against the oppressed. In contemporary Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) thinking, China has long been internally viewed as a weak, oppressed
country fighting against powerful imperialists. Thus for many Chinese, any war fought
by their country is by definition a just conflict even a war in which China strikes first.”99
When the British and other Western representatives arrived in China in the 1800s,
some Chinese leaders believed that the many “centuries of predominance had warped the
Celestial Court’s sense of [strategic] reality.”100 Instead of relying on a tribute-based
diplomatic presence backed by strong imperial military power, to protect their national
and international interests, the Imperial leadership had devolved to a point where they
maintained “no knowledge of armaments.”101 As a result, the British fleet arrived to
enforce terms of trade through coercive military power and diplomacy through what are
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referred to by the CCP as “unequal treaties” leading to the “century of humiliation.”102 As
Henry Kissinger said about the arrival of the British, “…the Europeans did not view
[their activities] as conquest at all. They were not seeking to replace the existing dynasty-they simply imposed an entirely new world order essentially incompatible with the
Chinese one.” At the same time, “an expansionist and military dominant Russia sought
to pry loose China’s vast hinterland [from the north and west]…” Russia, like the
Europeans, had no desire to claim the “Mandate of Heaven” from the Qing rulers, but to
achieve their East Asian security and strategic objectives. However, the Japanese, “[did
not have a] vested interest in the survival of Chinese ancient institutions or the Sinocentric world order. From the east it set out not only to occupy significant portions of
Chinese territory, but to supplant Beijing as the center of a new East Asian international
order.”103
Due to the lack of strength within the Middle Kingdom, then led by the Qing
government, the “century of humiliation” became the rallying cry that future leaders of
the People’s Republic of China seized upon to ensure that China would never be
perceived weak again and would do whatever it took to restore itself to its “rightful
place” as the keeper of peace and harmony in world order. To do this required a stronger
military force, the embracing of new economic models “with Chinese characteristics” as
well as investments in science and technology as the keys to progress and the
advancement of Chinese values. Today, vestiges of the Confucian principles of
protecting and restoring the territorial integrity of China are still ever present in the CCP
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plans and strategies. This desire to achieve strength and the “rightful place” of China in
the international hierarchy of nations leads to the present Chinese nature which is more
aggressive in nature, including the use of strong military power cloaked in the aura of
self-defense and the promotion of peace in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
Manifestations of Strategic Culture in Chinese Strategic Decision Calculus
When reviewing this historical development of the Chinese strategic culture one
can see the importance of sovereignty, self-defense, territorial integrity and cultural
superiority of strength to the Chinese government. These strategic cultural concepts
mentioned earlier, such as sovereignty, and the Sino-centric worldview of territorial
integrity have influenced CCP views of the United States, the space environment, space
deterrence, and warfighting doctrines. Given the present international order is based
upon Western values, norms and moral principles, deterring the leadership of People’s
Republic of China in space and on Earth requires more than simply projecting
“universal” norms upon them, expecting them to simply agree to it, and to cease all
development and deployment of their space weapons programs. As seen above, the
Chinese have a very unique worldview based on centuries of history, a fusion of
philosophical/religious views of Sino-Centric harmony, collective identity instead of
individual freedom and the importance of maintaining control through active defense, and
the resolution of unsettled claims in the returning of China to its rightful place of
dominance and power.
While the United States holds free agency and individual liberty to be central to
its way of life and helped codify these principals within the United Nations Charter for
centuries the Chinese were first and foremost members of a collective. This includes the
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clan, the village and especially the family.104 The individual was not and is not presently
viewed as an “encapsulated unit who maintained a unique identity, across social
settings.”105 The Chinese counterpart to individual liberty is “harmony.” As a member of
a perceived harmonious society, as individuals the Chinese have been concerned less
with issues of control of others or the environment than with self-control within this
system so as to minimize “friction” with others in their family and village and to make it
easier to obey the requirements of the state” regardless of the governmental form or
political ideology.106 The ideal of happiness within the present day Chinese Dream is not
a life allowing the free exercise of distinctive talents, but the satisfaction of a plain
country life shared within a harmonious society. Communist leader Mao Zedong tapped
into this collective, harmonious identity in the 1930s and 1940s when he created the
People’s War concept and the PLA that executed the Party’s wishes to eventually take
control of the mainland and unify China once again. This plan still remains a priority to
regain its rightful place as a world power and ensure the control of Chinese destiny to
reclaim lost territories and gain influence through CCP expansionist objectives in the
Pacific and worldwide.107 As current Chinese President Xi Jinping has stated: “In the
best of Chinese traditions, generations of overseas Chinese never forget their home
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country, their origins, or the blood of the Chinese nation flowing in their veins. They
have given their enthusiastic support to China’s revolution, construction and reform”.108
This collective agency is an elaboration of a deeply rooted concept going back
thousands of years, of the obligations that were maintained between the emperor and
subject, parent and child, husband and wife, and older brother and younger brother. The
Chinese cultural system, absorbs the individual into a large, complex society where these
obligations are the guide to ethical conduct in the Sino-centric world. This type of view
impacts the Chinese concept of offensive deterrence. The strategic reality of the Chinese
view of the early 21st century space and terrestrial environments is as it has been for
years: to the Chinese space strategist, and key CCP leaders, the world is constantly
changing and is full of contradictions.109 To the Chinese strategist, to understand and
appreciate one state of affairs in complex strategic planning requires the existence of its
opposite, what seems to be true now may be the opposite of what it seems to be.110 Thus,
this type of view is applicable to the strategic domain of space, when the Chinese sign
onto international agreements such as the Outer Space Treaty (OST) when their strategic
behavior appears to trend toward another course. As John Boyd stated, strategists must
focus not on technology or capabilities assessments in a vacuum, they must recognize and
follow strategic behavior.
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Some examples of this include that Chinese legal authorities and methods of
negotiation reserve the right to change their position or withdraw from treaties that many
in the West view as eternal. They reserve the right to change, given that what was true in
1967 may not be true today or supportive for the goals and objectives of the China
Dream. This China Dream, which is the re-establishment of the Sino-Centric order, or in
other words, harmony in place of the friction that dominates the United States led
international system under the UN Charter.111Senior CCP leaders have repeatedly stated
the importance of China’s role in “building a harmonious world internationally” as the
keepers of and propagators of harmony in the world.112 Xi Jinping has stated numerous
times that “every one of the 1.3 billion Chinese [are part of the team necessary] to
disseminate Chinese morality and culture.”113
In the Chinese view, the world moves in endless cycles, not a perpetual linearity
leading to exponential growth and prosperity among equals in the international system.
This complexity of the Chinese view is highlighted by the continued use of the Tao-or
“the Way.” While Confucianism stressed economic well-being for the collective order,
the Tao blended with this philosophy to appreciate the contradictions and changes and the
need to see things as a whole. This is integral to the notion of the perceived “yin-yang
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universe” which also complements the longstanding Chinese strategic philosophy and
supports the collective obligations to the Party as the keeper of the culture and order.114
While an American view of transparent, integrated political interaction with all
nations may imply a view towards a gradual evolution toward a more globalized world
that shares Western values of liberty, free trade and freedom of access to the “shared
spaces”115 of ocean, air and space, the Chinese hold fast to their unique civilization as
superior and returning as the nation at the center of the universe “by 2020”116. China will
remain fixed and not adapt into a new form as some believe is the inevitable future of
China, but continue to bring other nations under their leadership as “little brothers”
within the hierarchy of a restored Sino-centric rule. A twelfth century neo-Confucian
named Lu Jiuyuan described this mentality by highlighting the connectivity between the
past, the present and the future of Chinese strategic thought and the identity as a unified
land within the restoration of a perpetual Sino-centric world order: “The universe is my
mind and my mind is the universe. Sages appeared tens of thousands of generations ago.
They shared this mind; they shared this principle. Sages will appear tens of thousands of
generations to come. They will share this mind; they will share this principle.”117
Chinese President Xi Jinping puts this thought forward in the following manner:
For Chinese people at home and abroad, a united Chinese nation is our shared
root, the profound Chinese culture is our shared soul, and the rejuvenation of the
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Chinese nation our shared dream. The shared root fosters eternal brotherhood, the
shared soul links our hearts, and the shared dream holds us together—we will go
on to write a new chapter in the history of the Chinese nation.118
How does this extend to space?
While the current international space legal regimes such as the OST have been
ratified by the CCP, the Chinese may be heading toward a different view of where
sovereignty ends. To the CCP, there is no legal demarcation that would prevent the CCP
from extending sovereignty into space.119 While the OST states in Article II that space “is
not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or
occupation, or by any other means,”120 from a legal perspective, there are troublesome
indications that an increasing number of publications by influential Chinese authors
advancing the principle that China’s sovereign territorial airspace extends through outer
space. 121 As justification for its position, Chinese authors assert that territorial claims to
outer space are not inconsistent with international law because there is no legally
accepted definition of “outer space” that defines the demarcation point at which territorial
airspace ends and outer space begins.122 They then state that due to this lack of a formal

Xi, Jinping. “The Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation, a Dream Shared by All Chinese.” The
Governance of China. 2014. P. 69
119
Nayebi, Nima. “The Geosynchronous Orbit and the Limits of Westphalian Sovereignty.” Hastings
Science and Technology Law Journal. Vol 3:2, May 2010. P. 491
120
United Nations Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. 1967
121
United Nations Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. 1967
122
In the early days of the Space Age, there was differing interpretations on where space began and
airspace ended. Since the Eisenhower Administration, while the United States does not explicitly define the
demarcation between air and space, unofficial views offer 50 miles as the demarcation point when
awarding astronaut status. The Soviet Union originally had a view similar to China’s prior to Sputnik,
however after attempts at justifying overflight of other nations, the freedom of overflight norm became
customary.
118

36

agreed definition into a claim, China asserts sovereignty over all of orbital space above
its territory.123 Given the recent Chinese actions to exert sovereignty over ever expanding
terrestrial land and ocean claims in the Pacific region such as the South China Sea and the
East China Sea through the establishment of Economic Exclusion Zones and Air Defense
Identification Zones, there are some concerns that the buildup of Chinese counterspace
capabilities and the very different strategic worldview and culture of the Chinese
government could lead to legal assertions by the Chinese government that the Exclusive
Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act provide legal basis for any attacks on foreign
spacecraft overflying Chinese territory.124 As Major General Cai Fengzhen and his coauthors make clear,
The area above ground, airspace, and outer space are inseparable and integrated.
They are the strategic commanding height of modern…warfare…The airspace
over territorial waters and territorial lands are protected, but there is no clear
standard in international law as to the altitude to which territorial airspace
extends.”125
According to Chinese government writings, in order to defend their territorial
integrity on Earth and deter the perceived threats from United States or allies, these
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threats to Chinese interests declared in the CCP assertions of sovereignty over disputed
claims in the Pacific such as Taiwan or the South China Sea island chains, gives impetus
for the requirement to maintain robust and multi-layered “space attack” forces. 126 These
forces must consist of “real capabilities” in order to have “effective [offensive]
deterrence.”
Unlike the DoD’s space deterrence framework which relies upon Western valuesbased international agreements and codes of conduct for sustainability of the sanctuary of
space, the Chinese view of space deterrence consists primarily of warfighting capabilities
that “threaten” adversaries from using their own space and/or terrestrial capabilities
against the Chinese forces pursuing their strategic objectives. 127
In addition, Chinese negotiators in business and government are trained in the 35
Stratagems and Sun Tzu’s Art of War. As such their negotiating style is rooted in the
duality of the Confucian/Taoist teaching of cooperation coupled with competitive
stratagems.128 When counterpart negotiators are seen as adversaries and their interests are
perceived to be in conflict, such as impositions of Western values and norms that
negatively impact sovereignty control and territorial integrity, the “mobile warfare” style
is used. This style’s primary objectives are to “exhaust, destabilize, and weaken the
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adversary by various means, including concealment, deception, and espionage.”129. A
mobile warfare negotiator in space codes and treaties “will not hesitate to disseminate
false information and misrepresent facts in order to mislead. Chinese negotiators often
increase their bargaining edge by stimulating open competition between competitors”
with the goal to “weaken the adversary.”130 Some of the stratagems used against
adversaries in treaty or code of conduct negotiations include:
-Hide a Knife behind a smile: “Charm and ingratiate yourself to your
adversaries. Once you have gained their trust, move secretly and attack them”131
-Lure the tiger to leave the mountain: Chinese throughout history have
preferred to maintain “home court advantage” in negotiations and operations. This
is “both psychological and physical. Whereas [Chinese] are in their natural
environment, not pressed by artificial deadlines” and the cost of forward force
projection, Western forces and negotiators are far from home, “cut off from
headquarters, their families, and under deadline pressures”132
-Await leisurely the exhausted enemy: Chinese negotiators understand and
value resources. Their goal is to preserve their own capabilities and resources,
“they wage war of attrition to frustrate and deplete the counterpart
psychologically and physically.”133
This highlights how understanding strategic culture negatively impacts the NSSS
“deterrent [deterrence?] through norms” that rely on the development of “norms of
responsible behavior” as defined by US and European worldviews. In order to be
successful in any interaction with the Chinese mode of negotiation and operations is that
understanding their worldview and strategic culture is “not enough. Equally important is
[having] strategic advantage.”134
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Despite this view of international negotiation and the requirement to maintain
strategic advantage with capabilities such as weapons systems to threaten adversaries
from using their space or terrestrial capabilities, the Chinese cloak their efforts in the
traditional dualistic framework of self-defense or “active defense”. As one Chinese
military document highlights:
China is a Socialist state; it pursues a defensive national defense policy and a
military strategy of active defense, advocates peaceful use of outer space…[and
wants to] provide support and safeguarding support for socioeconomic and
military activity….does not seek space hegemony [but will]…exercise the
homeland’s lawful space rights and ensure space security; and only when another
state conscientiously infringes upon China’s space rights and interests and causes
harm to national space security, may China implement space deterrence against
the enemy, and launch a space counterattack.135
In the People’s Liberation Army writings on space warfare and deterrence,
developing these “real capabilities” for space counterattack are considered an “integral
part of battle planning by the People’s Liberation Army in any future conflict.”136 This
includes “periods of tension” as well as other levels of conflict. Space forces, unlike
nuclear forces, are considered by Chinese military writers to be at a much lower threshold
of use and therefore “space strategic power must not only have a deterrent effect, but real
warfighting potential.”137
In the Chinese language, the definition of deterrence is different than that of the
Western world. While the United States views deterrence as the prevention of war
through cost/benefit calculation and attempts at controlling misperception in the minds of
an adversary, the Chinese word for deterrence weishe is a combination of coercive
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“punishment” strikes and deterrence.138 This is reflected in PLA authors encouraging
commanders to “gain space dominance” as “space warfare directly serves one
geographical part of an entire area of a war and its success or failure has immediate
impact on the course and result of the war.”139
The PLA’s strategic guidance regarding deterrence requires that the PLA “must
take the Party’s strategic thought regarding military deterrence as [the main view] of the
world, the nation and the military…”140 The CCP and the PLA’s view of the world
believes that “the danger of a large-scale invasion initiated from the outside is basically
ruled out…[however]..the danger of a local war triggered by the escalation of a crisis and
conflicts always present, and has become an important factor interfering with…strategic
opportunities for national development.”141
The focus of all deterrence operations, including in the space domain for the PLA,
is to effectively deter behaviors that endanger China’s core interests and major interests
through enhancing military capabilities to fight for the initiative of the strategic overall
situation.142 In order to create the means to achieve the initiative in the overall strategic
situation requires “powerful comprehensive national power” to provide for effective
deterrence effects. This valid or credible threat is only possible when looked at from, as
Chinese military writings put it, as “integrated-whole” deterrence. Once this is achieved,
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then demonstrating the political will combined with the capability to achieve victory then
and only then, would the PLA and the CCP be ready to “conduct the activity in a
concerted way, and successfully perform full preparations for going from deterrence to
war to impose powerful strategic pressure on the opponent.”143
How does the PLA organize their concept for space deterrence? First, according
to PLA writings, the integration of space with other military forces is important in order
to form the most effective military force possible. By having the strongest military force
possible, says Chinese authors, can a nation deter other nations from attacking it.144 This
view has been seen in recent orders by President Xi Jinping for space to become
integrated in all aspects of Chinese military operations.145 Second is having a credible
counterspace capability to threaten other nation’s space assets in order to deter the
opponent from using its counterspace capabilities. “In this way, both sides would be
reluctant to attack the others space assets lest they also come under attack.”146
In addition to having a credible counterspace capability for effective space
deterrence, the Chinese advocate that they should reveal “firm resolve to dare to and
prepare to use this capability” in order to create “certain psychological pressure on and
fear in the adversary, and [force] the adversary to dare not conduct space operations with
initiative.”147 This includes conducting “limited space operational activities with warning
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and punishment as goals” as a means of de-escalation of the crisis.148 This view of forcedependent deterrence reads more like a traditional deterrent model than even the present
DoD space deterrence framework that purposely avoids a credible threat of counteraction in the event of an attack on U.S. space assets. As PLA writers state, the goal of
deterrence is to “choose appropriate deterrence means to display the horribleness,
severity, and urgency of the consequences.”149
If a “period of tension” arises, Chinese writers state that it is vital to achieving
strategic objectives terrestrially to “deliver destructive strikes to the enemy using
maximum power in order to fight rapidly, conclude the operation rapidly and to withdraw
from the confrontation.”150
As seen in the Chinese strategic culture that views the world and the international
system in a holistic manner, the same holds true with their view of the many “zones” that
the space domain covers with respect to space deterrence.
“[It] covers vast areas (zones) from the cosmos at tens of thousands of kilometers
from the Earth to the Earth’s surface, with many areas [zones] forming an organic
whole…space military struggle…[is] a synthesis of many types of correlated
military activity, including space to space, space to ground, and ground to
ground.”151
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The Chinese do not “share the same interests” in the space domain or a view of
enhancing the status quo of a U.S.-dominated international order. They are, according to
many scholars, on a “quest for wealth and power.”152 As one author stated, the Chinese
are “no longer guided by Maoist proletariat ideology, [and] now see [space]…technology
as a major factor in its rise as a world power as it seeks increased influence and
independence. China’s pursuit of spacepower is a reflection of this emphasis on
technology and its grand strategy to “regain the nation’s former status as a great power
that controls its own fate.”153
Despite the NSSS’ goal of preventing the development, testing, and deployment
of space weapons systems, the Chinese possess the most rapidly maturing space program
in the world and are using on-orbit and ground based assets to support China’s national
economic, military and political goals and objectives.154 China has, according to a recent
Pentagon report, “invested in advanced space capabilities, with particular emphasis on
satellite communications, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite
navigation, and meteorology, as well as…a vast ground infrastructure supporting
spacecraft and space launch vehicle manufacture, command and control, and data
downlink.”155 In addition to this supporting infrastructure, the PLA “continues to develop
a variety of capabilities designed to…prevent the use of space…by adversaries during a

Pollpeter, Kevin. China Dream, Space Dream: A Report Prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Commission. IGCC. 2014.p. 106
153
Ibid.p. 106
154
2015 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic
of China. P. 13
155
Ibid. p. 14
152

44

crisis or conflict including the development of directed-energy weapons and satellite
jammers.”156
In addition, since the ASAT test in January 2007, the Chinese have continued to
develop and test ground launched kinetic interceptors for space attack, with testing since
2007 being non-destructive. The 2015 DoD Report to Congress on Chinese Military
Developments discusses several tests of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) capable interceptors as
well as tests that appear to highlight a Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) capable
interceptor capable of reaching at least 22,300 miles. These test programs indicate that
while the DoD space deterrence framework speaks to the DoD’s stated deterrence and
dissuasion of testing of counterspace weapons systems, China has not given any
indication of ceasing these tests or of PLA development of doctrine for space warfighting
because of the four element approach of DoD space deterrence. Why would this be?
According to Chinese military authors, testing and development of space and
counterspace technology is important for effective space deterrence:
“Even in a relatively peaceful period, under circumstances where a hostile
relationship is unclear, the presence and development of one side’s space systems
and the boosting of its space capability, still can potentially influence and
constrain the military activity of other nations and generate a certain deterrent
effect.”157
As mentioned earlier, some DoD analysts believe that transparency of military
space activities is vital for preventing the use of outer space for military engagements of
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either reversible or destructive means. However, given the very different worldview and
strategic culture of Chinese decision makers to the space domain and their historical and
long term view of the international order, this foundational view of the DoD Space
Deterrence framework has not improved the security of American assets in space.
The Western mindset sees “transparency and openness as the surest way to peace”
and believes that “when one state can effectively monitor another, fears of surprise attack
are mitigated, and the tendency to overestimate a potential opponent’s capacities and
intentions are minimized. With transparency, the security dilemma is obviated and
cooperation is possible.”158 However, this is not the way the Chinese see transparency
and openness. As one author correctly describes:
To a [Chinese] strategist, letting an opponent know precisely one’s strengths and
weaknesses merely invites attack. The key to stability in this view is uncertainty-not knowing how strong or how weak an opponent is and never, under any
circumstances, revealing one’s own strengths or weaknesses. The more sure the
knowledge, the more crafty the countervailing plan, the more likely its success.159
Why should we shun transparency, embrace adaptability and unpredictability in
our spacepower strategic support planning? Xi Jinping sums this view up when he stated
that:
Boasting a vast land of 9.6 million sq km, a rich cultural heritage and a strong
bond among the 1.3 billion Chinese people, we are resolved to go our own way….
We must not blindly copy the…models of other countries nor accept their
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dictation…As a Chinese saying goes, “Standing firm when assailed by rain and
wind from all directions, our confidence is supported by our core values”160
Given the long history of “humiliation” and weakness at the hands of Western
“unequal treaties” and the establishment of the current UN system (created without the
Chinese Communist Party’s involvement) transparency is not something that can be
assumed with the Chinese government. It goes against the Chinese strategic culture of
secrecy and deception in negotiation style as mentioned earlier and would create an
impression of weakness domestically and internationally of the CCP. Due to this the CCP
may view the sharing of such information as detrimental to their survival as the keepers
of the strategic culture, governance and the PLA’s power and not a mutually beneficial
path toward preservation of a Western dominated status quo. If capabilities are shared
with the potential “enemy” it would be to “selectively...reveal China’s space technology
and space capability, and adopt an oppositional mode to reduce their expectations for
space weaponization and to increase their degree of difficulty and costs in space
weaponization.”161
During peacetime however, PLA strategic guidance on deterrence recommends a
combination of hiding one’s capabilities and keeping a low profile with active actions for
war preparations such as testing and escalation control to include low-intensity warfare
“until our deterrence goal is realized.”162 This highlights the value of avoiding
transparency as part of a long term stratagem ignoring the ineffective American course of
action of transparency as part of the NSSS deterrence concept.
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Instead, the United States should utilize uncertainty like the Chinese, given
uncertainty enables friction that can create foundational strategic impediments for the
adversary. The current strategic situation in space and on Earth, due to American and
allied inaction, enables the Chinese to gather information and offensive capabilities
needed to shape the strategic environment to the PLA advantage while giving the U.S.
leadership the perception that the United States is winning when in fact they are losing to
complex Chinese deterrence activities imposing friction on US and allied space
operations and terrestrial strategy.163 Clausewitz describes this phenomenon well when
he stated:
Friction (which includes the intersection of many factors, such as uncertainty,
psychological/moral forces and effects, etc.) impedes activity. Friction is the only
concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from
war on paper.164
A more recent strategic theorist, Colonel John Boyd, USAF, stated:
Operate inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action loops to
enmesh adversary in a world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder,
fear, panic chaos …and/or fold adversary back inside himself so that he cannot
cope with events/efforts as they unfold.165
Why would these two strategic thinkers focus on friction and uncertainty?
Because the atmosphere of war is friction, friction is generated and magnified by menace,
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ambiguity, deception, rapidity, uncertainty, mistrust, etc. These are the actions that the
Chinese are engaged in space and in their increasingly belligerent and expansionist
activities in the Asia Pacific region. This friction in the strategic sense, is the opposite
and de-stabilizing side of the strategic Tao, with harmony/initiative generated by
“rapidity and variety” leading to strategic success for China using the Observation,
Orient, Decision, Action loop or also known as the Decision Calculus Loop.166 As Sun
Tzu was cited as saying, “Those who use arms well, cultivate the Way (Tao)…”167
Orientation, seen as a result, represents what Boyd referred to as “images, views
or impressions of the world shaped by genetic heritage, cultural tradition, previous
experiences, and unfolding circumstances.”168 In other words, Boyd is defining what is
called strategic culture today and is defined by Kartchner as “that set of shared beliefs,
assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted
narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other
groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security
objectives.”169 Once the DoD strategists and policymakers grasp these important aspects
of strategic context, understanding that the Chinese are doing the same thing as part of
their analysis, they can take that information and orient the nation’s strategic posture
based on the patterns discerned relating to adversary activities and at the same time
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denying our adversary the possibility of discerning patterns that match our activity as part
of our strategy execution.170
A few examples of Chinese strategic patterns of behavior include their use of
force within crisis situations over time. For example, surprise is a very important pattern
of force projection within the PLA. In October 1962, China conducted operations against
India due to territorial disputes. The Chinese launched major, rapid attacks, which
succeeded immediately. After a short pause, “the Chinese renewed their attacks in midNovember” using the doctrines of the classic Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu. These include:
“all warfare is based on deception….therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when
active, inactivity….Pretend inferiority and encourage [adversary] arrogance…Attack
where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you….These are the
strategist’s key to victory. It is not possible to discuss them beforehand.”171 Thus in order
to be victorious, it is not beneficial to achieve strategic success through TCBMs; rather
surprise attacks and deception are key to strategic victory.
Secondly, another pattern is achievement of psychological and political shock.
While some commentators such as Michael Krepon may believe that Chinese offensive
deterrence strikes are “unlikely,” this highlights the lack of real observational
understanding of the strategic culture and doctrines of the PLA.172 Psychological or
political shock of a pre-emptive strike may be the payoff that the PLA is looking for
rather than simply trying to gain a complete military advantage over U.S. capabilities. As
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a result, a rapid, destructive, limited attack with kinetic energy anti-satellites (KE
ASATs) could create conditions that lead the United States or its allies to “become
disheartened and defeatist as a result of the unexpected reverse he has suffered and may
be induced to reduce his war aims” or perhaps change U.S. policy objectives in the
Pacific to the Chinese advantage.173 What is more, is that achieving such a psychologicalpolitical shock is magnified in the case of a military force that has limited forceprojection and sustainment capabilities, such as the current posture of the DoD space
forces that only contains reversible means of counterspace operations.
An example of psychological shock leading to policy changes for an adversary is
again found in the 1962 India campaign where the PLA adopted a punishment strategy
that undercut Indian self-confidence174. By doing so, “the Chinese achieved a more rapid
and decisive change in policy than would likely have emerged from a long-drawn-out
negotiation in which the Chinese tried to trade the captured territory for an Indian
recognition of Chinese ownership of the territories they held before the border war
began.”175 Some may argue that a Chinese attack on U.S. or allied space systems is
unlikely because the [military] benefits would not outweigh the costs. However, a
counterargument can be made that DoD strategists and policymakers lack sufficient
understanding of the strategic culture needed to properly orient the American space
posture to be prepared to decide and act when necessary to protect space systems.
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In addition, it is important to note that China has even used force not only to settle
a crisis such as that with India, but also have “typically used force to create a crisis.”176
Understanding this unique strategic orientation of the PLA forces is vital to understand
the strategic reality as it is, and not as some would like it to be, to ensure American
strategic interests and homeland are properly secured in space and terrestrially.
The view of having space weapons as a means of CCP survival and territorial
integrity through robust military power is key to understanding the linkage that Chinese
military writers have of spacepower with nuclear weapons as well. The Chinese view the
nexus of spacepower and nuclear weapons not as separate domains of operations, but
rather as “an integrated-whole composite strength for strategic deterrence.”177 As one
PLA author stated:
The party that enjoys superiority in space will secure its survival by weakening
the enemy’s nuclear deterrent capabilities, thereby increasing tremendously one’s
nuclear deterrent power. Space forces constitute both a space shield and a space
sword.178
This quote highlights another disturbing yet important reality for American strategic
planners to grasp: the development of space attack systems and a credible deterrent
threat against U.S. systems also include the attacking of nuclear command and control
space support segments. As the same PLA author describes this in further detail:
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“Commanders should actively take the initiative to strike at an enemy’s vital
targets because “only through active offensive operations and counter-attacks can
one seize and maintain the initiative. Specifically, vital targets include
information, command and support systems. Hitting these vital targets through
concentrated strikes is especially recommended in cases where the PLA faces a
“powerful enemy equipped with high technology weapons and equipment” rather
than conduct wars of annihilation…the first targets of a campaign…are the
detection, command and telecommunications information systems, whose
degradation or destruction will negate or reduce the enemy’s ability to control
information and create conditions for later combat.”179
Chinese military strategists recommend attacking these key information and
command and control nodes because PLA analysts assess that space-based information
“…will become a deciding factor in future wars, that space will be the dominant
battlefield, and that in order to achieve victory on Earth and preserve sovereignty
control of Chinese territory and expanding core interests, the PLA must first seize
the initiative in space. This will require China to achieve space supremacy,
defined as the ability to freely use space and to deny the use of space to
adversaries.”180
Moreover, “the assessment that space is the dominant battlefield [emphasis added] has
led PLA analysts to conclude that war in space is inevitable.”181
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Chinese leaders and strategists have increasingly regarded the dominance of space
as critical to their domestic and international security transformation- which the CCP
considers intertwined.182 Hu Jintao noted in 2004 that the “progress of the times” and
Chinese economic development were pushing Chinese security interests into space and
that the space domain along with the maritime regions were the two critical areas of
Chinese expansion.183 Furthermore, he stated:
“With the opening up and development of our country’s economy, our national
interests have gradually gone beyond the scope of traditional land territory,
territorial waters, and territorial airspace. In order to safeguard our everexpanding national interests, military strategy needs to expand its vision, not only
paying attention to and safeguarding our country’s interests in survival, but also
paying attention to and safeguarding our country’s developmental interests; not
only paying attention to and safeguarding traditional security of land territory, [we
must pay] attention to…safeguarding security in such areas as the ocean, space
and information. In order to provide strategic support for the expansion of
national interests.”184
This statement is just one of many that highlights the expanding list of “core interests”
that China expects other nations, including the United States, to respect despite not
reciprocating the respect of other nations’ core national interests such as Japan or the
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United States.185 Understanding and observing this unique identity demonstrates the
importance in the Chinese strategic calculus of the connection of harmony and friction to
achieve strategic success. Strategic success within complex endeavors such as deterrence
of war, or the prevention of and/or preparing for war in space, has been defined by one
American strategic theorist to include dominance in utilization of time and space with
effective means, but more importantly, effectively staying ahead of the adversary’s
“mental, moral and physical” aspects of strategy.186 This requires understanding the
adversary’s (in this case-Chinese decision makers) unique decision calculus, in order to
ensure one has the appropriate strategy for spacepower to support with deterrence-but a
deterrence that requires strength, focus and vision to achieve strategic success.187
In making this assessment, Chinese writings are similar to U.S. writings on space
from the 1950s and 1960s. This includes “a universal belief that space is the strategic
high ground, and a prominent role for manned military space missions, including the use
of manned military space planes, space stations, and lunar bases.”188 One type of “vital
target” related to “informationalization” (gaining information dominance) is America’s
space-based ISR assets. As Kevin Pollpeter noted in his recent report, “The denial of
overhead capabilities integrated with cyber and kinetic attacks against non-space based
C4ISR nodes could greatly complicate the ability of the U.S. military to flow forces to
the region and to conduct operations effectively.”189 ISR capabilities it should be noted
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are viewed as key because, unlike the Western view of overhead ISR satellites serving as
a stabilizing function, allowing for knowledge of potential adversaries to prevent
miscalculation, Chinese military strategists and CCP leaders view this capability to be
“battlefield preparation” and not for stabilization.190 Chinese analysts have stated that
“battlefield situational awareness is the core of information age warfare…which means
that one must be able to destroy or jam the systems that are fundamental to that
situational awareness.”191
This plan for Chinese space deterrence focuses on “rapid, destructive”
engagements on the “low-threshold” types of U.S. space systems that are “easy to attack
and difficult to defend” as well as “select attacks against the critical node [s] of enemy
space systems” to exploit the heavy reliance on space systems for peacetime and wartime
operations in the Pacific.192
Chapter Conclusions
The manifestation of Chinese strategic culture in the development of negotiations
of space treaties, codes of conduct, and conventions as well as PLA offensive space
deterrence doctrines highlights serious gaps in the National Security Space Strategy’s
four elements approach to deterring potential near peer adversaries such as the Chinese.
In addition to not fitting the classical definition of deterrence from a Western perspective
as highlighted in Chapter 1, the NSSS space deterrence concept does not prevent the
Chinese concept of “attack to deter” in space, but rather continues on a path that keeps
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US and allied systems vulnerable and may very well provide the easy-to-strike targets
capable of doing grave damage to U.S. force projection capabilities as well as economic
and societal stability within the homeland.
The Chinese have a unique view of the world and themselves, and the space
domain. China’s strategic culture is not the same as that of the American culture, and
promotes a more active, offensive form of deterrence than the one found in the NSSS.
This strategic culture is based on a long view of history as well as an understanding that
the world is not a linear process but a complex, constantly changing place where the
struggle and victory of harmony over friction is key to the China Dream of regaining
their leadership position as the dominant nation. As keeper of the Tao or Way toward
harmony in the world, the PLA plan for space dominance through active defense and
rapid, destructive space warfare places US space systems vulnerable to surprise attack.
The United States must develop means to deter Chinese counter-intervention strategies
supported by their space attack infrastructures they believe will aid the achievement of
terrestrial objectives in the Pacific and worldwide for the Chinese government.

57

CHAPTER 3: CREATING A TIERED, TAILORED, TRIAD: DEFENDING THE
U.S. SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE
Most governments when asked to choose between war and peace are likely to choose
peace because it looks safer. These same governments if asked to choose between getting
the first or second strike will very likely choose the first strike…once they feel war is
inevitable, or even very probable… Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War 1960
Space fighting is not far off. National security has already exceeded territory and
territorial waters and airspace and territorial space should also be added. The modes of
defense will no longer be to fight on our own territory and fight for marine rights and
interests. We must also engage in space defense as well as air defense. Teng Jianqun,
People’s Liberation Army analyst, 2001
American space infrastructure is not only an inherent strategic asset for the United
States; space supporting ground and orbital segments are also a vital piece of the nation’s
critical defense infrastructure.193 As such, it is a key center of gravity for America’s
instruments of national power. This fact is not lost on potential adversaries such as the
People’s Republic of China who have assessed that spacepower is America’s “soft
ribs.”194 Due to the continued integration of space capabilities and applications into
American society, PLA writings highlight the “grave aftermath” that would result if U.S.
space systems are destroyed or incapacitated.195 This all points to the need for U.S.
decision-makers to ensure that U.S. space capabilities are protected and available to
support the safety and prosperity of the U.S. population, homeland defense and, when
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needed, force projection worldwide to defend national interests in the forward regions
such as space itself.196
Unfortunately, the NSSS’ concept of deterrence has not protected our critical
space infrastructure from purposeful interference nor has it deterred the development,
testing and deployment of offensive space attack systems. The DoD Space Policy speaks
of purposeful interference when it states “purposeful interference with U.S. space
systems, including their supporting infrastructure, will be considered an infringement of
U.S. rights.”197 This chapter will explore what is needed to create an effective and
credible space deterrence posture.
Readiness for Chinese Rapid, Destructive Wars in Space
The PLA has stated in their recent strategy documents that future wars, including
those that begin in or extend to space, are to be “destructive” in nature and rapidly
executed to achieve their objectives.198 This rapid, destructive warfare includes the
development, testing and deployment of KE ASAT interceptors as part of the Chinese
multi-pronged “space attack architectures”.
The strategic reality that the true norm of behavior in space is that of reversible,
yet purposeful interference, highlights how the DoD space deterrence construct within the
National Security Space Strategy has failed. In addition, the employment of KE ASATs,
a developed, tested, and deployed, survivable mobile warfare approach in China,
highlights another partial failure of this deterrence concept on the non-reversible side of
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the spectrum. Therefore, because the United States lacks a credible, effective deterrent to
the use of reversible counterspace attacks upon the space sector of American critical
infrastructure, the use of KE ASATs in an active, surprise attack campaign is still a threat
to be deterred from use against American and allied interests.
The Chinese development of “mobile warfare” ASAT missile systems for both
Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) altitudes provides the
PLA space forces with the ability to conduct a first strike against the critical
infrastructure of the homeland and armed forces, while the U.S. does not have a
dedicated program or strategy to mitigate this threat.199 This constitutes a first-strike
instability in the favor of Chinese space forces.200
First-strike stability or instability is related to a concept that Glenn Kent and
David Thaler of The RAND Corporation developed in 1989 to examine the dynamics of
deterrence between two or more nuclear states.201 Forrest Morgan, also from RAND,
states that this concept is similar to crisis stability, which is “a measure of the countries’
incentives not to preempt in a crisis, that is, not to attack first in order to beat the attack of
the enemy.”202 This thought process did not review the psychological or strategic culture
factors present in the specific crisis. Rather, first-strike stability focuses on each side’s
force posture and “balance of capabilities and vulnerabilities that could make a crisis
unstable should a confrontation occur.”203
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Space, like the nuclear realm, is an environment with substantial incentives for
striking first should war appear probable, or in the case of Chinese strategic culture and
doctrine, if war can be deterred through coercive military actions or demonstrations in
space.204 However, unlike the nuclear realm, space is an “offense-dominant domain,
which is to say that holding space targets at risk is far easier and cheaper than defending
them.”205 Thus, American space-based and related ground critical infrastructure provides
a major center of gravity (COG) vulnerable for an adversary to target and damage life
and prosperity for American society.
Another way to see this is through an updated view of Warden’s Rings206. As seen
in Figure 1, each of the rings highlights a rung of a strategic air campaign leading to the
center ring which is the senior leadership or command and control, of the infrastructure,
military forces, etc. Given the interdependencies of the space infrastructure with other
areas of critical homeland importance, it is possible that a well-executed “space Pearl
Harbor” type operation could simultaneously create damaging effects upon all of the
rings at once.
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Figure 1: Warden’s Five Rings of Strategic Attack
Thus, as Bruce MacDonald, a leading voice on space warfare and the author of the
Council on Foreign Relations book China, Anti-Satellites Weapons and U.S. Space
Security, in testimony to the House Strategic Forces Subcommittee correctly states:
“The U.S. has an overriding interest in maintaining the safety, survival, and function of
its space assets so that the profound military, civilian, and commercial benefits they
enable can continue to be available to the United States and its allies.”207
To maintain the survival of U.S. space assets will require the acknowledgement of
a few important factors at the strategic level. First, protection and survival will require the
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acknowledgement that our space assets (both terrestrial and space segments) are critical
infrastructure to our nation’s economy and the international financial system.
Federal policies, including those within the DoD, highlight the importance of the
space sector to the many other parts of defense and national critical infrastructure. Recent
reports have highlighted that due to growing interdependencies between critical
infrastructure areas such as communications, transportation, energy and defense, there is
a “potentially a large cost in human life…or economic markets” if and when they fail.208
Criteria that define what makes infrastructure within the United States critical include: 1)
provide routine functions along operational paths essential for average or routine system
function 2) no handy, rapid substitutes exist, 3) sudden dysfunction in and around these
elements causes nontrivial harm, and 4) they are embedded in wide, functionally
reciprocal, integrated systems.”209 The more critical that these interdependencies
become, the “larger the cost of failure [they] are likely to have.”210 One small part of the
larger space sector that is interdependent with the transportation, defense, energy and
other infrastructure sectors is reliance upon the Global Positioning System (GPS)
navigation and timing signal. As one report states, “Because of the increasing reliance of
transportation upon GPS, the consequences of loss of the GPS signal can be severe
(depending upon its application), in terms of safety and…economic damage to the
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nation.”211 Another vulnerability related to GPS is the reliance of the energy
infrastructure on the GPS timing signal. One report summarizes this concern as follows:
“GPS has emerged as a key component of the power generation and distribution
network monitoring systems for data collection, fault detection, vulnerability
mitigation, and recovery. With its continued market penetration, the value of
GPS to the power industry is likely to grow, along with the impacts of
unanticipated disruptions.”212
Second, strategic reality in space requires an acknowledgement that active
defense, in concert with passive defense measures, of US space infrastructures are vital to
maintain information dominance in both diplomatic and military instruments of national
power as well as support to include homeland defense and overseas force projection in
defense of US interests as well as allied defense treaty obligations. For example, James
G. Lee of Air University wrote:
“…since information dominance can create uncertainty regarding the focus and
thrust of the theater campaign, offensive counterspace operations should normally
precede other theater operations. To attain information dominance, offensive
counterspace operations should use a combination of [kinetic and non-kinetic]
weapon systems to attack the operational center of gravity of a space system.
Depending on the space system, the enemy, and the level of conflict, the center of
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gravity can be located in any of the three segments of an enemy’s space
system.”213
The Chinese understand this as part of the counter-intervention strategy with their space
attack system enabled “informationalization.” As such, in order for the United States to
generate sufficient friction and uncertainty in the mind of an adversary, information
dominance supplied through counterspace operations is a must. This can be accomplished
through “soft kill” or a “hard kill” and depending on what type of space power the US
employs, could target ground segment or space segment. 214
Fourth, strategists must acknowledge that space is an offense dominant domain
and in order to provide effective deterrence, the United States must actively protect its
space systems through a credible offensive counterforce capability to reverse the firststrike instability due to the Chinese KE ASATs and their satellite reconstitution launch
capacity.
While some assert that first strike stability is something that can be gained
through the present NSSS, the facts as observed show the opposite is true. Space is
indeed unique from other domains, but not in the way that some describe it. Space is an
offensive dominant domain and as such, defense is challenging especially in the kinetic,
irreversible sphere. As a result, the Chinese view of deterrence makes much more sense
in assuring space protection than the NSSS’ view of space deterrence. In this view, the
posturing of forces for use as kinetic strikes against critical space infrastructure can be
viewed as an escalation of threat and therefore, this threat to the homeland and interests
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of the nation should be neutralized before the attack can be made against whatever target
or system is at risk. Mao once said he believed the Western view of waiting until one was
attacked to be too passive.215 Our current posture attempts to treat space as if there is a
means to defense, while not providing for a defense or real protection of this vital
resource for our homeland.
Finally, American strategists should recognize that deterrence requires getting
into an adversary’s decision process through observation and analysis of their strategic
culture, doctrine, and strategic behavior; orient the U.S. force posture accordingly and be
prepared to engage in military operations preventatively when necessary to actively
defend space infrastructure and maintain escalation dominance in crisis or conflict.
Deterrence, or war prevention, requires an understanding of the adversary, the
adversary leadership’s decision cycle informed by its strategic culture and resulting
worldview. Deterrence must be focused on the adversary senior leadership’s decision
processes and not the individual citizen of China, the adversary leaders’ means of
commanding and controlling forces and shaping the strategic and operational levels
through the holding of vital adversary targets at risk. How does one accomplish this
strategic deterrence formulation between a Western nation that traditionally relies on its
near term technological gains, training, and linear based tactical planning to formulate
operational objectives and strategic end states against a potential adversary that thinks
holistically, identifies themselves collectively and maintains a long term vision?
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The U.S. senior leadership must develop a realistic strategy that DoD/IC
spacepower can support and that highlights the unique space domain defense
requirements in order to effectively protect its space based critical infrastructure. How
can the United States gain real, effective deterrence in the Pacific? Understanding the
adversary decision calculus is the first step. This requires observation into the adversary
command and control structures and processes.
The United States defense leadership should create a space support strategy that
enables the means to remove the perception that attacking space infrastructure is a lowthreshold action that will have no response in kind. This perception has led the PLA
down the path of creating space weapons as part of the Chinese overarching counterintervention strategy which targets the vulnerability of the architecture, the perceived lack
of will to actively defend those assets or counter those increasing risks to American way
of life and operations. In short, the US must remove the temptation to strike at what has
become the image of “soft ribs” for both deterrence of attack on the homeland as well as
extended deterrence protections of allies as well. This image must be reversed. How? We
must act upon the knowledge and understanding of strategic reality and use our resources
at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries.
One way to do this is to take what America already has in current programs of
record, across multiple services and agencies and flip the Tao on its head. The United
States should exploit operations and weapons that:



Generate a rapidly changing environment (quick/clear observations,
orientation and decisions, fast-tempo, fast transient maneuvers, leading to
quick kill when needed)
Inhibit a potential adversary’s capacity to adapt to such an environment by
clouding or distorting their observations, orientation and decision calculus
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Simultaneously improve our own command and control and space force
posture, offensive deterrence capabilities and options for senior leaders to
compress our own time to decision and actions (kinetic or non-kinetic),
while stretching out the adversary’s time to generate a favorable mismatch
in time/ability to shape and adapt to change.
The goal would be to collapse the Chinese’s current strategy of counterintervention (supported and enabled by multi-layered space forces) into
confusion and disorder by causing them to over or under react to activity
that appears simultaneously menacing as well as ambiguous, chaotic, or
misleading. In short, the goal is to get ahead in their own strategic game of
expansion and domination of the space environment as well as the
terrestrial engagements supported by offensive space deterrence.216

Counter-Strategy Part 1: Integrate Space into Homeland Defense Strategy
As PLA space systems are tied to the homeland defense of the Chinese mainland,
space systems are also a part of American critical defense infrastructure of the U.S.
homeland as well as for the international economic system, any future U.S. space
deterrence concept must be tied into the homeland defense strategy of the United States.
This fits with the present definition of homeland defense which is “the protection of
United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure
against external threats and aggression.”217 [Emphasis added]
The Department of Defense states in doctrine that the United States will execute
homeland defense “by detecting, deterring, preventing and defeating threats from actors
of concern as far forward from the homeland as possible.”218 Space has been
acknowledged in U.S. national strategies of the past to be one such vital “forward region”
requiring coordination between services and agencies to ensure that the external threats
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do not impede the societal operations and the continued advancement of the protection of
life and property.
To accomplish this, the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint
Operating Concept provides five mission layers to accomplish within the forward regions
and should be the high level framework for protecting our homeland’s space critical
infrastructure and “ensuring the freedom of action, full access and use of capabilities…in
space”219 :


Detection



Deterrence



Preventative Actions



Defeating Threats



“As Far Forward…as possible”220

First, the detection of threats in the forward region of space requires space situational
awareness (SSA). As a mission area, the DoD has invested in SSA ground based sensors
such as the Space Surveillance Telescope (SST), the C-Band radar, and the Space Fence.
In addition, the Space Surveillance Network (SSN), originally designed to track space
and missile threats to the United States from the Eisenhower years forward, has provided
a catalogue of space objects for US Strategic Command’s Joint Functional Component
Command for Space (JFCC SPACE).221 In 2014, the U.S. Air Force launched the newest
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space surveillance system called GSSAP (Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness
Program) to monitor the GEO orbital regime. While a good start, this is an area requiring
much more fidelity and accuracy to ensure a robust understanding of space activities and
potential threats to American space systems. How much fidelity and accuracy are
required necessitates further analysis beyond the scope of this paper.
Second is deterrence, the main theme of this thesis and of the NSSS. While the
NSSS is linked to the Strategy for Homeland Defense by the DoD, in practice there has
not been much connectivity with this strategy just as there has been no real deterrence
capability or capacity in the NSSS itself. It is recommended that, for true deterrence to
work as part of an overarching strategy for defense of American freedom of action222 and
population’s access to our critical space infrastructure, that effective deterrence and
protection, requires a layered capability for action, not rhetorical implements of perceived
norm building. This concept of deterrence has been shown to be flawed given the present
strategic reality and culture of the People’s Republic of China’s view of space warfare.
This will be covered in more detail later in this chapter.
Third is preventative action. This is essentially taking the Chinese concept of
“attack to deter” and applying it to the U.S. homeland defense of space capabilities.
Given the aforementioned offensive dominant nature of the space forward region, and the
difficulty if not near impossibility of actively protecting space assets from attack,
especially kinetic attacks, self-defense may require a preventative attack against the
Chinese “mobile warfare” space assets such as their KE ASAT systems. Should
Freedom of action in space is a principle held by the United States since the early days of the Space
Age. It refers to the ability to freely access and execute operations of varying types (military, civil,
commercial), without harmful interference or prevention and/or negation of those actions in space.
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indications and warnings from our overhead reconnaissance satellites, aircraft, or SSA
sensors indicate that ground-based space attack assets are posturing to leave their bases, a
preventative strike on those mobile KE ASATs may be the only sure means of defending
the homeland’s critical space infrastructure.
As reversible means of counterspace activities such as jamming may already have
been targeting our space systems in various orbital regimes, this type of preventative, and
limited set of strikes should be viewed as a counterstrike and not a first-strike. The goal
of this would be gaining escalation dominance over the situation to put the United States
and its allied partners in a better position to dictate terms and to achieve the objectives of
the next level of homeland defense strategy: defeating threats.
Defeating threats is the fourth level of the present homeland defense strategy and
doctrines within the forward regions and the approaches. This requires capabilities and
the political will to engage and defeat the threat as far away as possible from the United
States and as stated in the Strategy for Homeland Defense of 2013. Space is much further
from the homeland in many cases than engagements in the air domain or cyber domains.
However, it must be recognized and remembered that for centuries, international law
recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to
defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack.223 This was
the reason behind the Eisenhower Administration’s directive to create our overhead
reconnaissance satellites to assure the ability to prevent surprise attack against the forces
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or people of the United States in Pearl Harbor-style attack.224 The build-up of adversary
space forces should be no different.
The United States must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities
and objectives of today’s potential adversaries such as China, who do not seek in the near
term to attack us using conventional means. Instead, Chinese strategic and military
planners rely on asymmetric means to strike at the US homeland’s space-enabled
diplomatic, economic and information instruments of power, thus limiting the
effectiveness of the U.S. force projection from US bases into the Western Pacific. Their
space weapons, terrestrially-based, kinetic and non-kinetic, can be used in various
permutations without warning and without following a specific method of escalation such
as from reversible means to kinetic - it could be all out kinetic strikes without any
indications of reversible purposeful interference.
This long-held option of preventative attack is needed in order to defeat threats to
American and allied space systems linked to the homeland and our civil and military
operations worldwide. The magnitude of this growing threat and its link to the homeland
make it more compelling than in the past when commanders had other priorities in other
operating domains following the early Space Age and space systems had yet to prove
their mission utilities to a broader audience than nuclear deterrence support.
Given the interdependent nature of our space infrastructure with other vital areas
of American critical infrastructure such as energy, commerce and financial markets, even
if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of an adversary attack on space or related

Terrill, Delbert A. The Air Force Role in Developing International Outer Space Law. Air University
Press. May 1999. p. 4
224

72

ground components, the U.S. should keep options open to act preventatively to defeat the
attack while in the forward regions and not afterwards.225 The present day language of
“fighting through” and absorbing attacks will detract, not enhance, deterrence or
American leadership in providing “a safe, operating environment…to enhance trade and
exploration.”226 Threats of attack must be defeated prior to the mobile warfare pieces are
moved out of a visible, targetable location, otherwise, the final aspect of homeland
defense doctrine, “as far forward as possible,” will become a lost opportunity in the event
of a crisis erupting.227
Counter-Strategy Part 2: Escalation Dominance-Based Space Deterrence228
Given the analysis of the strategic culture of China, warfighting doctrines, and
space force developments and deployments as part of their overarching counterintervention strategy in the Pacific, American strategists should create a national security
space strategy that supports and acknowledges the strategy of homeland defense and the
core interests of the United States in the Pacific. To do this requires shaping the
capabilities and support infrastructure into an operational framework capable of
providing the President with the capabilities needed to address each of the potential types
of deterrence scenarios required. Adapting Herman Kahn’s tiered approach to deterrence,

Paraphrased and updated from the 2002 National Security Strategy view on pre-emption as means to
defeat attacks against the homeland. Edited for current space environment and ASAT threats.
226
Dolman, Everett. Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age. Frank Cass. 2002. P. 157
227
Keep in mind that according to Chinese analysts, the Chinese have in the past been willing to create a
crisis by using force to achieve their policy objectives. RAND’s study on Chinese Patterns of the Use of
Force in 1999 highlighted examples of this and showcased how the Chinese term for crisis has a mixed
meaning of opportunity and danger.
228
Escalation dominance is defined by the RAND Corporation’s Dangerous Thresholds p. 15 as: “a
condition in which a combatant has the ability to escalate a conflict in ways that will be disadvantageous or
costly to the adversary while the adversary cannot do the same in return, either because it has no escalation
options or because the available options would not improve the adversary’s situation.”
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this framework includes three Tiers: Tier 1 Deterrence, Tier II Deterrence and Tier III
Deterrence.
Tier 1 Deterrence addresses the Chinese view of a nuclear-spacepower nexus they
term “strategic deterrence.” The survival of the CCP and the PLA in the context of their
space enabled counter-intervention strategy creates an escalation dominance effect should
the United States not create a capability to create friction in Chinese planning. This
requires publically declaring that the United States will not tolerate interference or attacks
upon systems supporting US nuclear command and control, will be considered
escalatory, threatening stability between the two nations and the survival of the U.S.
homeland, supporting critical infrastructure and populations. This will require the
posturing of American space forces forward from terrestrial launching sites at sea and in
the air, as well as posturing of nuclear forces as a strategic communication to Beijing as a
means to achieve policy change objectives.
Tier II Deterrence addresses the buildup of Chinese terrestrial and orbital
counterspace forces to threaten the US space infrastructure ground and space segments.
This deterrence requires a multi-layered counterspace portfolio capable of providing the
President with multiple options to include preventative attacks on adversary ASAT
garrisons, directed energy weapons as well as Chinese space based ISR and
communications capabilities. The goal of these strikes would be to achieve a limited war
aim of self-defense of U.S. space systems and the protection of the means of 21st Century
American society and instruments of national power. In addition, it could also support a
larger aim such as the creation of friction, uncertainty, and disunity in Chinese command
and control within the mainland and throughout the Pacific region.
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This requires the development and deployment of a survivable triad of capabilities
utilizing a joint or allied combined force concept on land, air, and sea229. On land and sea,
a modified version of the Aegis/Standard Missile-3 missile defense system could be
deployed in a ring around the Western Pacific island chains from Alaska down through
Australia and India. Coupled with sensors already in theater, with those launched into
GEO for SSA, these weapons have the capability of not only achieving a LEO or a
Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) ASAT capability against potential adversary ISR assets, but
could also provide a notional space reconstitution denial system at mid-course altitudes.
Finally, these systems could provide a means to defend US assets against terrestriallylaunched ASAT missiles fired from deployed “mobile warfare” locations. Table 1
highlights these attitude regimes of the SM-3.230

This triad of capabilities for space warfighting and defense is not to be confused with the nuclear triad of
bombers, submarines and ballistic missiles. This is strictly terrestrial based space forces.
230
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Estimated SM-3 maximum reachable altitudes
SM-3 Variant

Burnout
Velocity in
(km/s)

Maximum Reachable Altitude
(km)

Block 1A

1052

1952

Block IIA
(lower range)

1080

2025

Block IIA
(upper range)

1095

2175

Finally, the sea and land-based legs of the counterspace triad includes airlaunched ASAT capabilities that can be based overseas or at home as part of a new global
space sovereignty alert force, capable of engaging targets in all orbital planes and at
varying altitudes. The technology for this is also available through several research and
development programs going back decades such as the successfully tested Celestial Eagle
concept, as well as DARPA’s current Airborne Launch Assist Space Access (ALASA)
program. ALASA is a program dedicated to providing a low-cost means to get satellites
into orbit and as such could serve as an ASAT platform as well as an operationally
responsive, low cost reconstitution method for some mission areas and orbital altitudes.
The ability to relocate and launch quickly from virtually any major runway around the
world substantially reduces the time needed to launch a mission. Launching from an
aircraft provides launch point offset, which permits essentially any orbit direction to be
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achieved without concerns for launch direction limits imposed by geography at fixedbase launch facilities.231
Tier III Deterrence would require only reversible counter-action leveraging the
purposeful interference norm of behavior as deterrence or retribution to terrestrial actions
or actions against space segment assets. This would require a series of capabilities to
negate signals or types of signals in an entire channel, sets of channels, an entire
transponder, sets of transponders, the entire satellite, the entire constellation of a certain
satellite type, all satellites flagged by the adversary, or all satellites--regardless of
registry--that are suspected of aiding the adversary in its counter-intervention strategy.
This would provide a debris-free alternative, provided of course that the adversary does
not see the benefits of escalation to kinetic exchanges for a combined
countervalue/counterforce strike. This provides a potential for deterrence through the
threat of “soft kill” against adversary capabilities to target the Pacific Fleet, disrupt
effective command and control of U.S. and Allied forces and create lower levels of
escalation dominance to achieve policy objectives and ensure access to space capabilities
and benefits for the homeland [the defense of the homeland’s space dependent way of
life].
Each of these tiers would require a tailored approach given the different potential
adversaries. In the case of China, a more aggressive approach based on escalation
dominance would take the Chinese decision cycle and invert it in the favor of the United
States and its allies. To ensure that a decision loop is conducted in sufficiently rapid

Clapp, Mitchell Burnside. Airborne Launch Assist Space Access Fact Sheet.
http://www.darpa.mil/program/airborne-launch-assist-space-access
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manner with enough variety in capabilities and response types to maintain uncertainty
and unpredictability in the minds of the adversary, a decision tool is required for
strategists and commanders to enable them to decide what course of action the adversary
patterns are highlighting, how to stay ahead of their decision calculus, and how to
effectively confuse and paralyze it. One method is through a space warfare escalation
ladder as depicted in list below:
Non-Interference/Peaceful Use of Space
1. Freedom of Action in Space (civil, commercial, military use of space for benefit
of nation and world)
2. Intelligence/SSA Collections (Passive/Active)
Reversible, Yet Purposeful Interference Threshold (Deny/Degrade)
3. Passive Jamming
4. Active Jamming/Cyber Attacks
5. Laser Tracking/Dazzling
6. Unauthorized, Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Near U.S. or allied
spacecraft
7. Posturing/Mobilization of Destructive Space Attack Forces
Irreversible, Purposeful Interference Threshold (Damage)
8. High Energy Chemical Laser
9. High Power Microwave Weapons Use
Kinetic, Debris Generation Threshold (Destroy)
10. Kinetic Energy (KE) Anti-Satellite (ASAT) missiles (Terrestrial Based-LEO)
11. Kinetic Energy (KE) Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons (Co-Orbital)
12. Kinetic Energy (KE) Anti-Satellite (ASAT) missiles (Terrestrial Based-GEO)
Nuclear Use Threshold (Destroy)
13. Terrestrial Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems (FOBS)
14. Orbital Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP)
15. Orbital Nuclear Strike against spacecraft (all orbital regimes affected)
As with Herman Kahn’s escalation ladder of nuclear warfare, this space escalation
ladder is intended to serve as a tool for decision makers to assess the situation and stay
ahead of the adversary decision calculus by observing the patterns of strategic and
operational behavior, and re-orienting the U.S. space and terrestrial forces to be rapidly
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capable of escalating into a position that prevents the destruction of critical space systems
and the economic and information instruments of power. This proposed tool is not all
encompassing and provides only a few examples of adversary actions within each
threshold to provide context. Also, it is important to note that just because this shows a
step by step method of escalating space engagements from peacetime to total war, an
adversary is not limited to starting with reversible means and staying there or gradually
escalating. Indeed, as the Chinese way of offensive space deterrence highlights,
depending on the decision calculus and the perceived level of opportunity or danger in a
given situation, PLA space forces could very well conduct an offensive combining
several thresholds or going direct to destructive, rapid attack postures to achieve their
policy and military objectives.
The first threshold is that of the ideal peacetime condition the present DoD Space
Policy promotes which is non-interference or peaceful use of space. This describes
conditions intended by the international space legal regimes such as freedom of action in
space for civil space exploration, commercial space development, and military uses of
space for the national and multinational interest. In addition, it also includes military
operations such as intelligence and space situational awareness operations to assure the
status quo is maintained by all spacefaring nations.
Once a state such as China crossed the threshold of reversible, yet purposeful
interference, the escalatory requirements for observing the jamming, laser tracking, or
dazzling type behavior would require sufficient, rapid response from U.S. leadership and
commanders to achieve a higher level of escalation through a combination of offensive
and defensive capabilities as well as uncertainty generated in the minds of the adversary.
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Once an adversary continues up the patterns and trends of potential denial and
degradation of U.S. space systems, U.S. leaders can choose to allow the adversary to
continue to deny and degrade our systems or to escalate the ladder to a higher level to
prevent further denial or a rapid escalation to the next threshold which is described as the
kinetic, debris generation threshold.
Once the kinetic threshold has been crossed, destruction of U.S. space assets are
the adversary’s clear objective within their destructive space warfare concept.. This could
be terrestrially-based ASAT attacks, or space-based co-orbital ASATs, and directed
energy weapons such as high power microwave and lasers. As the situation escalates, the
maximum damage that could be done is a more extreme scenario where the adversary
decides to destroy all threats to its national survival by detonating nuclear weapons in
space to deny the benefits of space and create severe havoc to the strategic space COG of
the United States and its allies and space partners.
Thesis Conclusions
The vulnerability of American and allied space systems by the Chinese’s rapidly
developing counterspace forces presents a major threat to the homeland as well as to
American forward presence and influence in the Pacific. As a result, it is key to
understand that in addition to being force multipliers for American force projection
worldwide, spacepower is also intertwined in every layer of U.S. critical infrastructure
including energy, transportation, finance, and information flow, placing the civil
population and the American way of life at risk. Thus, it is imperative that the United
States remove the vulnerability and actively sustain our space infrastructure while
providing the means to deter Chinese aggression in the Pacific. This requires the
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inversion of the Tao and moving friction and vulnerability from our side, to China by
utilization of Eastern deterrence methods and an escalation dominance based deterrence
construct. The National Security Space Strategy’s space deterrence concept does not
fulfill this vital task for the defense of the homeland and its freedom of action in space.
The inadequacy of the present NSSS approach to space deterrence that this thesis
has reviewed has become a concern within the halls of Congress as well as some sectors
of academia. In 2012, the late RAND strategist Therese Delpech, known best for her
work on nuclear deterrence theory, wrote:
“The United States is in a unique position because of its intensive and extensive
use of space-based systems…It possesses known asymmetrical advantages in
space and information technologies, but its superiority is associated with a major
weakness: the vulnerability of its space…assets to attacks…How it can secure its
space advantage for its own sake and that if its allies is one of the most important
security questions [of] the beginning of the 21st Century.”232
The United States Congress, in the FY15 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA), Section 1606, recognized that given the evolving and increasing threats to U.S.
space systems and the critical infrastructure of the nation by China and other states, the
DoD should re-think its NSSS space deterrence concept and force posture in order to
achieve an “effective deterrence posture” through “space superiority.” This thesis has
covered options related to many Congressional mandated requirements which include
offensive space operations and the active protection of national security space assets.233
Delpech, Therese. Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century. RAND. 2012. P. 144
FY15 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 1606, Update of National Security Space Strategy to
Include Space Control and Space Superiority Strategy
232
233
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While some analysts believe that promoting such a strategy of a tiered, tailored,
triad of offensive, terrestrial based capabilities to be destabilizing, the facts indicate that
the lack of these actions to provide active protection capabilities to the United States is in
truth the real destabilizing factor. First strike stability, escalation decision ladders, and
deterrence all must be re-invented, given the offense dominant nature of space and the
destabilizing nature of the Chinese advantage maintained in all three areas over the
United States.234 This thesis has attempted to begin this discussion toward a strategy that
utilizes current industrial capacity, programs of record, and is consistent with the legal
obligations of the Outer Space Treaty. Basing the protection of a vital COG of the
American way of life, economic power and military effectiveness on vulnerability and
passivity will lead to “ruin.”235 The time for allowing states and non-state actors to
purposefully interfere and threaten our critical space infrastructure with kinetic and nonkinetic first strike should end. A more aggressive and serious approach is called for given
the security needs of our time. Surprise attacks could occur in a matter minutes, and
countering this trend will not be easy, particularly since a reliable deterrence strategy has
not been publically articulated due to the risk of a crisis in space escalating out of control.
The risk of escalation, as in the Cold War nuclear standoff, has always been present in the
past, but in the case of space attacks, in an offensive dominant domain, is a different kind
of risk. However, as Therese Delpech stated with regard to this issue of space deterrence,
“deterrence by threat of punishment remains the best available strategy for the most
serious threats.”236
Delpech, Therese. Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century. RAND. 2012. P. 143
Ibid. p. 147
236
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